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NEITHER RULES NOR STANDARDS
Steven A. Dean*
Specifying the content of a requirement or a prohibition up front-e.g. replacing a
"reasonable speed" requirement with a fifty-five miles per hour speed limit-can make
life easier for enforcers and citizens alike. Recent efforts to substitute international tax
rules for decades-old standards may do just the opposite, jeopardizing the "miracle" that
is today's international tax regime. Enhanced information exchange and formulary
apportionment will undermine the legitimacy that is essential to the success of any
international legal regime. A better solution would overhaul the century-old benefits
principle to weave enforcement deep into the fabric of the international tax regime.
Only then will it meet today's tests as successfully as it once rose to the challenge of
double taxation.
INTRODUCTION
H.L.A. Hart observed that the laws that govern our behavior draw
strength from principles that operate unseen in the background. As
he put it, the spark of "rules of recognition" can transform a lifeless
"regime of primary rules" into a dynamic "legal system."' Without
more than a mere collection of rules to guide them, he concluded
that a community would stagnate, unable to shed outdated require-
ments or to embrace new constraints when needed.2
@ 2011 Steven A. Dean. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Article benefited from support
from a Brooklyn Law School Dean's Summer Research Grant and from helpful
suggestions and comments from Kim Brooks, Allison Christians, Claire Kelly, Diane
Ring, Ted Janger, and from the participants in the University of Richmond Law
School Faculty Colloquium and the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association.
1 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 94 (2d ed. 1994).
2 For example, a town might agree on the need to impose speed limits, but not
on the underlying rationale for them. Some might support the limits for environ-
mental reasons while others do so out of safety concerns. Without a consensus princi-
ple, a subsequent call for carpooling would face an uncertain fate. The carpooling
initiative might languish because of the lack of a shared principle to buoy it (if many
in the town were environmental skeptics). Its momentum may be slowed still further
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For international law, Hart concluded that his insight offered
grounds for both optimism and pessimism. On the one hand, "the
absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsory juris-
diction, and centrally organized sanctions" does not necessarily mean
that international law cannot exist.3 On the other, he suggests that
crafting a principle-"a basic rule of recognition"-sufficient to
assuage "doubts about the legal 'quality' of international law" would
be tantamount to catching lightning in a bottle. 4
International taxation demonstrates the truth of both perspec-
tives. No World Tax Organization exists,5 yet a skein of treaties and
laws lays claim to the title of "international tax regime" and forms a
bulwark against double taxation.6 As a result, what should be an
intractable problem-allocating global tax revenues among sovereign
states-has been anything but.7 The benefits principle8 may not be
the catalyst Hart believed capable of transforming an assemblage of
international tax rules into a vital system of laws, but the success and
stability of the international tax regime over nearly a century suggests
that it comes close.9
by the absence of the validation that accompanies widespread observance (if the
requirement met with significant resistance). Put differently, the attitudes and behav-
iors of the townsfolk might render a carpooling requirement illegitimate. Conversely,
if the town shared a commitment to environmental preservation, a law compelling
carpooling might be superfluous.
3 HART, supra note 1, at 214.
4 Id. at 237.
5 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the
Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1573, 1631 (2000) (" [I]t is not an authoritative 'world
tax organization' that designs international tax rules, but each country acting sepa-
rately with its own interests in mind.").
6 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1303 (1996) (arguing that a network of harmo-
nized bilateral treaties forms a "coherent international tax regime ... that enjoys
nearly universal support").
7 See id. at 1305-08 (explaining allocation process that avoids double taxation of
cross-border income).
8 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L.
REV. 507, 509 (1997) ("The Benefits Principle assigns the right to tax active (business)
income primarily to the source jurisdiction, while the right to tax passive (investment)
income is assigned primarily to the residence jurisdiction."); Nancy H. Kaufinan, Fair-
ness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 145, 183-88
(1998) (exploring the relationship between benefit theory and international tax rules
such as the source rules).
9 Avi-Yonah describes the international tax regime as a "flawed miracle." SeeAvi-
Yonah, supra note 6, at 1303. David Rosenbloom takes a much dimmer view of the
international tax regime. H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the
"International Tax System", 53 TAX L. REv. 137, 166 (2000) (concluding that no such
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Unfortunately, unlike a true basic rule of recognition, the bene-
fits principle has not helped the international tax regime evolve over
time.10 The resulting mismatch between the demands made of the
international tax regime and its capacity has rendered it impotent in
the face of today's challenges.'" The ongoing struggle to replace the
international tax regime's standards with rules will only accelerate
that failure.' 2
The international tax regime has no shortage of problems or pro-
posed remedies.13 Today, the solutions tend to bet on the precision
of rules. Transnational enterprises remain square pegs to the round
holes presented by national corporate taxes.' 4 Formulary apportion-
ment-the chief rival of the more established arm's length method of
system exists). Rosenbloom reaches that conclusion in part because he sees no pnnci-
ple capable of filling that role. See id. at 137 ("The existence of overarching principles
of international taxation into which U.S. law somehow fits, with which the U.S. Senate
might be called upon to 'agree,' qualifies as news.").
10 See HART, supra note 1, at 91-99 (describing the three functions of a rule of
recognition as making it possible to identify laws, adjudicating disputes, and facilitat-
ing changes in those laws over time).
11 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
12 The rules versus standards debate has a long history and an impressive pedi-
gree. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
71-76 (1983); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules,
83 CALIF. L. REv. 953, 959 (1995).
13 Michael Graetz has, for example, lamented that the international tax regime
relies on outdated principles and inadequate concepts. See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing
International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1362 (2001). Diane Ring and Mitchell Kane describe the
perils of international tax arbitrage. See Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in
National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 53 EMORY L.J. 89, 90-95 (2004); Diane
M. Ring, One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage, 44
B.C. L. REV. 79. 79 (2002). It is also well recognized that traditional instruments of
international tax policy do a poor job of advancing relations between rich and poor
states. See, e.g., Allison D. Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 639, 712 (2005) (examining implications of
absence of treaties with African states). Scholars also offer advice to policymakers on
a broad range of topics. See, e.g., Ruth Mason, Tax Expenditures and Global Labor Mobil-
ity, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540, 1582 (2009) (addressing implications of tax treaties on
global labor mobility); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax
Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAx REv. 555, 575-76 (2007) (offering a proposal to capitalize on
international tax arbitrage to enhance international vertical equity).
14 See Elizabeth Chorvat, Forcing Multinationals to Play Fair: Proposals for a Rigorous
Transfer Pricing Theory, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1251, 1252 (2003) ("Perhaps the greatest prob-
lem facing the international tax system is the taxation of transfer pricing within
related groups of corporations. By guaranteeing that the allocation of profits among
5392011]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
allocating corporate profits among jurisdictions-promises the clarity
and ease of administration transfer pricing has long denied taxpayers
and tax administrators.15 Seeking to dispel the threat posed by tax
havens, enhanced information exchange offers tax administrators
hope that they may soon receive the same predictable diet of insight
regarding the behavior of taxpayers from abroad that they obtain
domestically.16
Although not characterized in such terms, both reforms seek to
replace a standard (the arm's length method and treaty-based infor-
mation exchange) with a rule (formulary apportionment and
enhanced information exchange) '7 In theory, trading standards for
rules has much to recommend it.18 The classic illustration' 9 of the ex
ante clarity that rules offer is the contrast between a fifty-five miles per
related parties reflects the economic reality . .. tax havens, tax competition, and cor-
porate expatriations, would be greatly reduced or eliminated entirely.").
15 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, Reforming Corporate Taxation
in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment, HAMILTON PROJECT,
June 2007, at 14-16, available at http://www.brookings.edu/topics/taxes.aspx.
16 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), Promoting Transparency
and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 1 4 (2010), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/26/28/44431965.pdf ("In 2009, more progress toward full effec-
tive exchange of information has been made than in the past decade.").
17 International tax scholars currently distinguish between features of the inter-
national tax regime as either "hard" law or "soft" law. See, e.g., Allison Christians,
Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010)
("While scholars and policy-makers debate the relative merits of soft and hard coordi-
native methods, practitioners and administrators must navigate the uncertainties on a
daily basis."); Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International Organi-
zations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649, 652 (2010)
("Thus, despite the formal, hard law power of the state over international tax policy,
international organizations influence the actual design of international tax policy and
tax rules in a variety of ways, up to and including the creation or exercise of 'soft law'
power.").
18 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 972. Sunstein enumerates the virtues of rules,
identifying, among others, their "simplifying effects," id., and their capacity to replace
"ambiguous and conflicting guidelines" so that "government officials [and] affected
citizens may reliably know their obligations in advance." Id. at 976. By specifying
outcomes in advance in relatively straightforward terms, both information exchange
agreements and formulary apportionment offer the appeal of greater simplicity and
clarity and the promise of reduced enforcement costs. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al.,
Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9
FLA. TAx REV. 497, 498 (2009) ("The U.S. [transfer pricing] system is also notoriously
complex; observers are nearly unanimous in lamenting the heavy compliance bur-
dens and the impracticality of coherent enforcement.").
19 See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 560. The quantitative limit leaves far less room
for ambiguity and disputes than the standard.
540 [VOL. 87.2
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hour speed limit and a standard that imposes a requirement of "rea-
sonable and prudent" driving speeds. 20
In the current international tax context, it is easy to conclude
that both taxpayers and tax authorities would find a shift towards rules
appealing.21 Nevertheless, the pivotal role legitimacy plays in eliciting
compliance from sovereign states makes such a transition treacherous.
Apparent advantages could prove disastrous if the very clarity for
which rules are prized exacts a high price in legitimacy.22
The allure of rules may merely draw states into legitimacy traps,
sapping strength from-rather than lending strength to-the mecha-
nisms that constitute the international tax regime.23 For example,
enhanced information exchange catalogues the information that
states should be-but are not-providing to one another, casting a
harsh light on the limits of states' commitment to international tax
cooperation. 24  Memorializing largely aspirational information
exchange requirements in a detailed legal document simultaneously
reveals the potential of the international tax regime and exposes its
shortcomings. Revealing precisely how far the regime's mechanisms
fall from the ideal may do more to discourage states' compliance than
improved clarity ever could to promote it.25 As this Article shows,
such legitimacy traps represent a grave threat to the continued vitality
of the international tax regime.
The Article begins by describing the headwinds faced by tax
authorities in enforcing the corporate and individual income taxes.
Part I considers the impact of corporate income shifting and individ-
ual tax evasion and the trend towards addressing each with rules
rather than standards. Part II shows why efforts to replace standards
with rules are misguided. Both offer advantages, but neither rules nor
standards can thrive without legitimacy.
Part III considers the importance of legitimacy-and its
decline-for the international tax regime and describes the dynamic
that produces legitimacy traps. Part IV proposes resolving those legiti-
20 See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 155, 155-56 (1999).
21 The arm's length standard illustrates the problem quite clearly. See Avi-Yonah
et al., supra note 18, at 506 (noting that since "neither taxpayers nor enforcement
authorities typically have clear standards for judging compliance" with the arm's
length standard, "issues involving very large amounts-billions of dollars-of federal
revenue are resolved" through a variety of relatively informal administrative
procedures).
22 See infra Part III.B-C.
23 See infra Part Ill.B.
24 See infta Part III.C.2.
25 See infra Part III.C.2.
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macy traps by replacing the benefits principle with the benefits and
burdens principle. As its name suggests, the benefits and burdens
principle enriches the standard account of what entitles a state to a
share of the global tax base.26 The Article concludes by describing the
transactional and aggregate methods of implementing the benefits
and burdens principle.
I. DOMINANT STANDARDS, ASCENDANT RULES
The international tax regime-if one exists at all-consists of a
host of disparate elements.2 7 Thousands of bilateral double tax trea-
ties and countless provisions of national law that govern the treatment
of international transactions can hardly form a seamless whole.28 Nev-
ertheless, important patterns emerge even in the midst of that
diversity.
This Part highlights one trend notable for its familiarity to legal
scholars of every stripe. Recent efforts to replace long-dominant stan-
dards with rules evoke a venerable scholarly debate.29 Unfortunately,
recognizing that proposals advancing formulary apportionment and
enhanced information exchange tread this well-worn path suggests
that they are less fruitful than they appear.30 Indeed, if the primary
26 In addition to allocating global tax revenues as a reward for doing what any
good government does as a matter of course, the benefits and burdens principle
would link each state's share to its efforts to address the rising threat of double
nontaxation. Such an arrangement would be consistent with a normative conclusion
that tax evasion and tax avoidance, referred to collectively as double nontaxation, is
undesirable. Some might see such a conclusion as implicit in the benefits principle
itself, so that a state's claim does not survive if it is not exercised. Making the benefits
principle conditional in that way could moderate its tendency to produce double
nontaxation. Unfortunately, it would not provide an affirmative incentive to provide
enforcement assistance to other states.
27 Even the existence of an international tax system can be contentious. See
Rosenbloom, supra note 9, at 166.
28 The OECD recently estimated the number of bilateral tax treaties in existence
at 3,600. See OECD, supra note 16, 1 13. The U.S. statutory provisions that govern
cross border transactions are numerous and varied. They govern everything from the
treatment of U.S. investors in foreign investment funds to the treatment of cross-bor-
der social security payments. See I.R.C. §§ 1291-1297 (2006) (describing treatment of
investments in Passive Foreign Investment Companies); I.R.C. § 871 (a) (3) (2006)
(specifying the treatment of U.S. social security benefits received by a nonresident
alien).
29 See supra note 12.
30 The trend is sometimes framed as an evolution from "soft" to "hard" law. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 TAx L. REv. 483,
496-97 (2004) (observing that features of the international tax regime are so widely
observed that they may have evolved into customary international-or hard-law);
542 [VOL. 87:2
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distinction between a rule and a standard is whether it "is given con-
tent ex ante or ex post," the shift towards rules in international taxa-
tion may be beside the point, or worse.31
A. Income Taxes in a Global Economy
Tax authorities must feel a bit like sea captains trying to navigate
a round earth with only flat-earth maps to guide them. In both the
corporate and individual context, the environment in which they
operate bears little resemblance to the one in which the provisions
they enforce took shape.3 2 Even a conservative estimate might date
the key features of the laws and treaties considered below as a half-
century old.-3 The following discussion offers a brief overview of the
challenges tax authorities face while administering that aging interna-
tional tax regime.
1. Corporate Taxation
Today's transnational businesses scarcely resemble their prede-
cessors of thirty years ago, let alone what passed for a multinational
enterprise in the 1960s.3 4 Spanning the globe, they defy the notion
Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J.
325, 332 (2007) (examining the use of the concepts of hard and soft law in interna-
tional taxation and questioning whether hard law should be viewed as superior to soft
law).
31 Kaplow, supra note 12, at 559.
32 See MichaelJ. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. Interna-
tional Taxation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1021, 1041 (1997) (describing evolution of the interna-
tional tax regime in the early twentieth century).
33 Transfer pricing rules, for example, were first introduced in 1917. See Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. Interna-
tional Taxation 4 (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 92; John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 07-
017, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1017
524. The arm's length standard arrived with regulations introduced in 1935. See id.
The modern transfer pricing regime took shape in the 1960s. See James P. Fuller,
Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAx L. REV. 475, 476 (1976) (describing circumstances that
led to the promulgation of the "far reaching" 1968 regulations, stating that "[t]he
most significant period in section 482's history started during 1961 when the Treasury
Department urged congress to make numerous changes affecting U.S. taxpayers with
foreign affiliates").
34 See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, An Alternative Transfer Pricing
Norm 6 Uune 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/
centres/tax/symposia/Documents/Dharmapala%20final.pdf ("The last thirty years
have witnessed a transformation in the scope of multinational firm activity.").
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that they belong to any particular jurisdiction in a meaningful way.3 5
With fundamentally rootless intellectual property making up an
increasing proportion of their value, associating their profit with a
specific location becomes more difficult.3 6
It is in that context that tax authorities attempt to regulate the
process known as transfer pricing.37 Transfer pricing involves the allo-
cation of taxable profits among the many jurisdictions in which trans-
national businesses create, manufacture, and sell.3 8 Although the
context makes it seem exotic, transfer pricing is no different than a
small business owner putting her son on the payroll to take advantage
of his lower marginal tax rates.39
The term transfer pricing derives from the process that related
entities undertake when they set a price on goods or services that they
transfer to one another.40 For example, take a business that makes
and sells contact lenses. If it manufactures and sells all of its products
in the same jurisdiction, there will be no international transfer pricing
problem. However, if it manufactures the lenses in Ireland and sells
them in the United States, tax authorities are left with the puzzle of
determining how much of the profit on each lens is U.S. profit and
how much is Irish profit.4'
Transnational businesses have developed many techniques for
maneuvering profit into jurisdictions with relatively low tax rates. A
business might take the dramatic step of moving all of its sales, its
entire staff and all of its productive assets from a jurisdiction with a
fifty percent tax rate to one with a ten percent rate. Doing so would
35 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1589-90 (using Intel and General Motors as
examples of how transnational enterprises are distributed across the globe, partly in
response to taxation).
36 See id. at 1590 (suggesting that the increasing importance of intellectual prop-
erty will make it easier for transnational enterprises to shift their operations to reduce
global tax burdens).
37 See id. at 1591 (describing transfer pricing).
38 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 2.
39 Such intra-familial income-shifting strategies were once so popular that Con-
gress requires the unearned income of minor children to be taxed at the (higher)
marginal tax rate the child's parents would have paid if they had received the
unearned income. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (2006).
40 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 2 (offering the example of a related manufac-
turer and reseller of computers).
41 They cannot rely on market forces to provide an allocation since the buyer and
seller are related. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 2 ("[T]he affiliated parties do not
care what the transfer price is, since it merely re-allocates profits within the affiliated
group.").
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allow its future profits to be taxed in the low-rate jurisdiction.42 The
objective of transfer pricing planning is to achieve the tax results such
a relocation would produce without the necessity of relocating.
A perfect example of a successful transfer pricing strategy
involves Bausch & Lomb's contact lens manufacturing business."3
Bausch & Lomb, a U.S. corporation, established an Irish subsidiary
and in 1981 granted that subsidiary a license to manufacture the
lenses in exchange for a modest royalty.44 Bausch & Lomb then pur-
chased the majority of the lenses produced by its Irish subsidiary. 5
The result of that series of transactions was that much of the
profit produced by Bausch & Lomb's industry-leading technology
remained in Ireland. Faced with a challenge by U.S. tax authorities,
Bausch & Lomb prevailed by demonstrating that the price charged by
its Irish affiliate was comparable to prices charged by other produc-
ers. 6 Bausch & Lomb's victory-shifting income from a high-tax to a
low-tax jurisdiction merely by transferring intangible assets to a
related party-reveals the depth of the challenge national tax authori-
ties face in today's global, technology-driven economy. 7
2. Taxation of Individuals
For national tax authorities, the threat posed by individuals is not
that they will report a disproportionate amount of their income in a
low-tax jurisdiction, but that they will not report their income any-
42 If the high-rate jurisdiction were the United States, the asset transfer itself
might be subject to tax toll charge of sorts on its exit. See I.R.C. § 367 (2006) (impos-
ing tax on certain "outbound" corporate reorganizations). Of course, even if such a
transaction made sense from a tax perspective, business exigencies might interfere.
43 See Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991).
44 See id. at 1087.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 1090-91. The Tax Court did, however, increase the royalty rate paid
by the Irish subsidiary to Bausch & Lomb. See id. at 1092.
47 The nature of the problem could also be presented differently, so that the
struggles of the arm's length method of transfer pricing flow primarily from theoreti-
cal deficiencies rather than practical challenges. See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note
34 (manuscript at 12) ("[T]he premise of ALP-that unrelated party transactions
serve as reasonable comparisons for intrafirm transactions-is inconsistent with the
modern theory of multinational firms."). Ultimately, the practical and theoretical
limitations reinforce one another. The increased importance of intellectual property
produces greater cross-border integration, exacerbating the administrative challenges
presented by the arm's length method. See id. at 11-12 ("In those areas of business in
which these ownership advantages are important (such as those in which intangible
assets are crucial), cross-border transactions will come to be dominated by MNCs, with
no arm's-length transactions between unrelated parties that can serve as a standard of
comparison.").
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where. 48 By routing their investments through a tax haven jurisdic-
tion, it can be remarkably easy for individuals to neutralize the
structural safeguards that have been so successful in encouraging tax
compliance domestically.49
When, for example, an individual considers whether to pay tax
on interest income she receives from a bank, she is far more likely to
do so if she can be certain that the bank has already alerted authori-
ties to its existence.50 Such third-party reporting is routine within the
United States.5 1 When a transaction crosses one or more borders, the
situation is quite different.
Even transactions involving only developed countries with coop-
erative tax authorities can quickly become anonymous. Assume a
French bank reports an interest payment paid to a U.S. resident to
French tax authorities who in turn notify U.S. authorities. Unless that
information is accompanied by a U.S. social security number, it can-
not automatically be linked to a particular taxpayer.52 Such informa-
tion may be useful in the course of an active investigation of a
taxpayer, but given the rarity with which taxpayers are audited, our
hypothetical taxpayer might well decide not to report the French
interest on her U.S. tax return.53
When an investment travels through a jurisdiction in which the
tax authority is uncooperative, ill-equipped, or both, the odds of
detection fall further.5 4 The potential for evasion in these circum-
48 "[M]uch of the income from overseas portfolio investments escapes income
taxation by either source or residence countries." Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1584
(attributing that compliance failure to the lack of information reporting and with-
holding in the cross-border context).
49 See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
Nw. U. L. REV. 655, 677 (2006) ("The use of structure to encourage tax compliance
has been an unqualified success.").
50 See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695, 697-700 (2007) (exploring the importance of third-
party information reporting and withholding for domestic tax compliance).
51 See Cheng, supra note 49, at 675-76.
52 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1584 (lamenting absence of "uniform, world-
wide system of tax identification numbers").
53 Domestic cash-based businesses and others not subject to information report-
ing or withholding often make the same calculation, contributing to disproportion-
ately low rates of compliance among those taxpayers. See Lederman, supra note 50, at
698 (explaining that compliance rates fall nearly in half when neither information
reporting nor withholding apply).
54 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1584 (describing the impact of a Mexican tax-
payer investing through the Cayman islands in a U.S. bank).
546 [VOL. 87:2
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stances can be significant.5 5 Anecdotal evidence supports the conclu-
sion that U.S. taxpayers exploit such flaws in the structural
enforcement network. One Cayman bank that came under investiga-
tion by the Justice Department turned out to primarily house U.S.
investments by U.S. investors.5 6 The bank served only as a means of
encrypting individuals' financial information. Decrypting that infor-
mation requires far more than a typical taxpayer audit.5 7
B. Rules and Standards
The primary tools tax authorities use to combat abusive transfer
pricing and international tax evasion have not changed much over the
past fifty years. Transfer pricing continues to rely on the arm's length
method to allocate profit among jurisdictions.5 8 Likewise, the bulk of
the taxpayer information that is exchanged between national tax
authorities changes hands pursuant to the information exchange arti-
cles of double tax treaties, just as it has since the World War II era.5 9
1. The Dominance of Standards
The arm's length method of transfer pricing does not specify a
precise technique transnational businesses must use to associate its
profit with individual jurisdictions. Rather than providing a uniform
quantitative formula for all businesses (the equivalent of a numerical
55 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRs, 109TH CONG., U.S. TAX HAVEN ABUSES 1 (COmm.
Print 2006), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/TAXHAVENABUSES
REPORT107.pdf (estimating U.S. revenue losses attributable to tax havens at between
forty and seventy billion per year).
56 Joseph Guttentag & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in
BRIDGING THE TAx GAP 100 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 2005).
57 One means governments have increasingly come to use is purchasing data sto-
len from banks located in tax havens. See Matthew Saltmarsh, Imminent End of Secrecy
to Shake Up Swiss Banking, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at B7 (describing the sale of such
stolen tax information as "something of a cottage industry").
58 Avi-Yonah describes the significant, but incremental changes Congress and the
Treasury have made to the arm's length standard over the past four decades. See Avi-
Yonah, supra note 33, at 18-25. He views the changes as an implicit rejection of "the
traditional and narrow ALS for the vast majority of [transfer pricing] cases." Id. at 18.
Nevertheless, the arm's length standard, as reinterpreted by Congress and the Trea-
sury, remains intact.
59 An information exchange article was first included in the U.S.-Sweden treaty in
1939 and has remained the predominant means of extraterritorial tax information
acquisition. See Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49
B.C. L. REV. 605, 644-49 (2008).
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speed limit) the arm's length method provides a flexible standard.60
Employing the international tax version of a "reasonable speeds" stan-
dard, it simply calls for integrated elements of a single enterprise to
behave as though they were unrelated.61 In other words, it mandates
that transactions between commonly controlled entities be conducted
as though they were occurring at arm's length between independent
parties.6 2
This approach leaves businesses with a great deal of responsibil-
ity-and authority-to determine what represents an arm's length
price.6 3 While their discretion is cabined by the statutory and regula-
tory framework tax authorities employ to gauge taxpayer compliance,
the use of a standard inevitably means that much of its content is only
specified when it is applied to a particular set of circumstances. 64 For
example, U.S. regulations specify an array of methods taxpayers may
use to demonstrate the compatibility of their transfer pricing methods
with the arm's length standard and encourage taxpayers to choose the
"best" method. 65 Businesses can even use a method other than one
60 Formulary apportionment sits at the opposite end of the spectrum, with a one-
size-fits-all rule for all transnational businesses. See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note
15, at 2 (describing application of formulary apportionment).
61 The premise of the arm's length method has become increasingly problematic
as firms become increasingly global and integrated. See Desai & Dharmapala, supra
note 34, at 11 ("The ALP envisages a world in which both related and unrelated par-
ties engage in economically similar transactions across national borders. However,
the modern theory of the multinational enterprise suggests that the raison d'etre of
these firms is that ownership confers various advantages in terms of productivity and
the avoidance of opportunistic behavior.").
62 The arm's length standard contemplates a wide range of approaches in setting
transfer prices. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 33, at 4 ("'[A]rm's length' refers to meth-
ods of determining transfer prices by using comparables . ... [but] can also be used
to refer to any method of determining transfer prices that reaches results (i.e., a
profit allocation) that are the same as those that would have been reached between
unrelated parties.").
63 The regulations specify a range of methods to be used in different circum-
stances. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (2011).
64 In other words, the content is specified on an ex post basis when a particular
allocation method is chosen. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
65 See Robert G. Clark, Transfer Pricing, Section 482, and International Tax Conflict:
Getting Harmonized Income Allocation Measures From Multinational Cacophony, 42 Am. U.
L. REV. 1155, 1191-92 (1993) ("[T]he IRS acknowledged that problems exist with
imposing a rigid hierarchy for applying valuation methods and therefore promul-
gated the 'best method rule."').
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the regulations describe if they can demonstrate that it is superior to
the enumerated methods. 66
Cross-border tax information exchange takes place pursuant to a
different type of standard. Like arm's length, it provides only a broad
sketch of the obligations it imposes.67 For example, the U.S. model
double tax treaty provides that the "Contracting States shall exchange
such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions of
this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States con-
cerning taxes."68 What that means in any particular circumstance is
left to the judgment of the tax authorities that are tasked with the
responsibility of providing and procuring that information.
At one extreme, the tax authorities charged with implementing
that standard might negotiate for the right to receive comprehensive,
automatic flows of information. In theory, that information could
play the same structural enforcement role as the information tax
authorities receive from private parties pursuant to domestic laws.69
More likely, the ad hoc flows of information contemplated by the pre-
vailing standard merely facilitate investigations into the affairs of par-
ticular taxpayers.
The U.S. stance on cross-border information exchange under-
scores its shortcomings as a structural enforcement mechanism. The
official U.S. interpretation of its own model information exchange
language specifies that it does not even permit tax authorities to
request information on par with that it receives routinely from domes-
tic sources.70 While that would be easy to dismiss as an historical leg-
acy of a disregard for extraterritorial tax information, today's
66 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(e) (2011) ("Methods not specified in paragraphs
(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section may be used to evaluate whether the
amount charged in a controlled transaction is arm's length.")
67 In this case, the obligations fall on tax authorities themselves. This is different
than the process by which a tax authority receives information domestically. Domes-
tic information reporting typically involves reporting by private entities. There are,
however, some circumstances in which federal authorities report information to states
and local governments and vice versa. See, e.g., I.R.S., Rev. Proc. 2010-26, 2010-30
I.R.B. 10 (describing the Combined Federal/State Filing Program).
68 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
NOVEMBER 15, 2006, at art. 26(1) (2006).
69 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
70 See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAx CONVENTION OF NOVEMBER 15,
2006, at 86 (2006) ("[T]he language 'may be' would not support a request in which a
Contracting State simply asked for information regarding all bank accounts main-
tained by residents of that Contracting State in the other Contracting State, or even
all accounts maintained by its residents with respect to a particular bank.").
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dominant information exchange mechanism also falls far short of the
earliest information exchange provisions.7' More than seventy years
ago, the United States and Sweden obligated themselves to make
annual, exhaustive exchanges of extraterritorial tax information to
facilitate enforcement.72
2. The Rise of Rules
While standards continue to play a central role in the interna-
tional tax regime, rules have gained a new prominence in recent
years. The two most visible initiatives of the past decade to modernize
the tools available to tax authorities have aimed to replace standards
with rules.73 Formulary apportionment offers an alternative to the
arm's length method that provides the ex ante content the prevailing
standard does not.7 4 Likewise, the effort to create a more effective
instrument for promoting cross-border information exchange has
emphasized the up-front specification of the rights and obligations of
national tax authorities.75
Formulary apportionment accomplishes the same allocative task
as the arm's length method.76 Unlike arm's length, it does so by iden-
tifying a set of readily observable criteria correlated with each jurisdic-
tion's share of global economic activity.7 7 Once the metric is selected,
71 See Dean, supra note 59, at 647-48. Early information exchange provisions
called for automatic exchanges of information that today's, information exchange
provisions would not permit even upon request. See id. at 648.
72 Convention Respecting Double Taxation, U.S.-Swed., Mar. 23, 1939, 54 Stat.
1759.
73 See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 15, at 2 (proposing the substitution of
formulary apportionment for the present arm's length based regime); ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION 46-47 (1998)
(launching the anti-tax haven effort that culminated in a wave of information
exchange agreements).
74 SeeAvi-Yonah et al., supra note 18, at 500 ("[T]here is universal agreement that
[the arm's length] standard leaves substantial room for uncertainty as to the 'correct'
transfer pricing .... ).
75 See generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (OECD), Agreement on
Exchange of Information on Tax Matters (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf (providing considerably more specificity than prevail-
ing double tax treaty information exchange provisions).
76 Avi-Yonah concludes the two approaches appear quite different but "despite
the common practice of contrasting the ALS and the formulary methods of dealing
with the transfer pricing problem, they are actually not dichotomous." See Avi-Yonah,
supra note 33, at 3.
77 See Avi-Yonah et al., supra note 18, at 508 (under formulary apportionment
"net income is apportioned among taxing jurisdictions based on a formula that takes
into account various factors").
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allocating the tax base becomes mechanical.7 8  Unlike the arm's
length standard, it does not require transnational enterprises and tax
authorities to determine how to employ it in any particular case.79
The significance of formulary apportionment's pragmatic
approach to the problem can be best appreciated by making an anal-
ogy to a more familiar regime. An income tax dispenses with the pre-
tense that it can measure a taxpayer's "ability to pay" by focusing
instead on the amount of "income" earned in a given year.80 In much
the same way, formulary apportionment dispenses with the prelimi-
nary step of constructing a hypothetical world in which each business
exists only within a single jurisdiction in order to then allocate profit
according to the benefits principle.81 It chooses a measure of a global
firm's presence in a given jurisdiction to serve as a proxy for the bene-
fits that jurisdiction provides to that firm.82 Accepting sales, for exam-
78 See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 15, at 2 ("Under our proposal, the U.S.
tax base for multinational corporations would be calculated based on a fraction of
their worldwide income. This fraction would simply be the share of their worldwide
sales that are destined for customers in the United States.").
79 Under the best method rule, the determination of the arm's length price is
established under a "facts and circumstances" test. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (2011)
("The arm's length result of a controlled transaction must be determined under the
method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable measure
of an arm's length result. Thus, there is no strict priority of methods .... ). The task
is complicated by the fact that the standard calls for the implementation of a standard
that is fundamentally at odds with economic reality. In particular, its assumption that
integrated transnational companies can be disaggregated for tax purposes is highly
problematic. SeeAvi-Yonah et al., supra note 18, at 501 ("[T]he assumption that each
affiliated company within the group transacts with the other members of the group in
the same way that it would transact if the members were unrelated. . . . defies
reality.").
80 Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code provides a very broad definition of
income. That definition is not so broad that it includes every item that would be
considered economic income. For example, the income tax considers only that eco-
nomic income which has been realized. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001 (2011) (specifying the
calculation of gain on the sale of property). That means that except to the extent that
Bill Gates has sold shares of Microsoft stock or received a dividend on those shares,
his investment in the corporation has produced no taxable income.
81 By contrast, the arm's length method calls for taxpayers and tax authorities to
disaggregate fully integrated transnational businesses, a task that brings to mind put-
ting toothpaste back in a tube. SeeAvi-Yonah et al., supra note 18, at 501 ("[F]or firms
that are truly integrated across borders, holding related entities within the commonly
controlled group to an 'arms-length' standard for the pricing of intracompany trans-
actions does not make sense, nor does allocating income and expenses on a country-
by-country basis.").
82 The formula often used in the U.S. domestic context-referred to as the "Mas-
sachusetts formula"-combines sales, assets, and employees. See id. at 509.
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ple, as a robust measure of a jurisdiction's entitlement would make it
quite easy to calculate each state's share of the global tax base.83
The debate between proponents of formulary apportionment
and arm's length is not new.84 One of the most recent salvos in that
debate is also one of the most thought provoking. Several years ago,
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Kimberly Clausing offered a detailed explora-
tion of the costs and benefits of a switch from arm's length to formu-
lary apportionment.85 After considering the implications of such a
change-including efficiency, complexity, and distributional con-
cerns-Avi-Yonah and Clausing judge formulary apportionment to be
superior to arm's length. They note that such a switch will inevitably
create winners and losers, but "despite concerns about systematic reve-
nue losses in some countries" formulary apportionment "would even-
tually help many governments by eliminating incentives for tax
competition. "86
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) provided the catalyst for modernizing the global information
exchange architecture.8 7 In a 1998 report, it decried the state of the
international tax regime and, in particular, the growing freedom of
taxpayers to hide income from tax authorities.8 8 Over the next dec-
ade, the OECD promoted the notion of enhanced information
exchange as the preferred response to the corrosive threat of tax eva-
sion. 89 Relatively unstructured cooperation has long been the
norm.90 The OECD advocates a very different approach. It envisions
83 See supra note 78.
84 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1339 (" [T] here are two approaches to this prob-
lem, which has been the subject of heated debate in the past thirty years. One
approach is the arm's-length method . . . and the other is the unitary or formulary
apportionment method . . . .").
85 See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 15.
86 See id. at 25.
87 Describing the transformation of the information exchange architecture as a
modernization may strike those familiar with the early history of information
exchange as ironic. The first information exchange provisions were every bit as pre-
cise as those currently being put into place. That precision was quickly lost as the still-
dominant information exchange standard took hold. See Dean, supra note 59, at
644-49 (describing the dramatic decline in the precision of information exchange
agreements from the model information exchange agreements developed in the
1920s and included in the earliest U.S. double tax treaties).
88 See generally OECD, supra note 73 (identifying the existence of tax havens as a
major threat to global welfare).
89 See OECD, supra note 16, 1 2 (summarizing OECD progress towards the elimi-
nation of tax evasion and avoidance).
90 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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automatic, highly specified exchanges of standardized "'bulk' tax-
payer information."9 1
Replacing a standards-based information exchange apparatus
with a more precise rule could create cross-border structural enforce-
ment mechanisms comparable to those that produce remarkably high
rates of compliance in the domestic context.92 Ideally, taxpayers
would come to assume that tax authorities know as much about their
offshore income and activities as they do about their domestic
income. Rather than adopting a defiant attitude towards tax authori-
ties, taxpayers would volunteer information about their cross-border
activities.93 That transformation would be the result of replacing a
standard (producing ad hoc information flows) with a rule (providing
a steady, predetermined stream of data).
In both the corporate and individual contexts, replacing stan-
dards with rules promises clear benefits. At a minimum, by providing
the ex ante content standards necessarily lack, taxpayers and tax
authorities would engage in fewer disputes. Both taxpayers and tax
authorities would be able to redeploy the vast resources that would
otherwise be devoted to their game of cat-and-mouse, increasing the
collective welfare. Of course, the story of rules and standards is not
nearly so simple.
II. RULES, STANDARDS, AND PRINCIPLES
Choosing between rules and standards is never easy.94 That
observation clashes starkly with the apparent international tax policy
consensus that progress demands more rules and fewer standards.
This Part first considers the conceptual framework frequently applied
to the international tax regime and explains why the more focused
lens of rules versus standards may, in this instance, be more useful. It
91 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv. (OECD), MANUAL ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS FOR TAX PURPOSES 3 (2006).
92 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
93 Like Foucault's panopticon, that transparency would persuade taxpayers that
noncompliance will inevitably be discovered and punished. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DiscI-
PLINE AND PUNISH 201-02 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978)
(explaining that once they accept that authorities have the capacity to monitor their
activities "it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behavior, the
madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the
observation of the regulations").
94 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 956-57 (observing that "[i]t would be hard to
overstate the importance of the controversy between" advocates for "clear, abstract
rules laid down in advance of actual application" and "law-making at the point of
application" (emphasis omitted)).
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then explores the insights of scholars regarding the factors to be
weighed when deciding between rules and standards in the domestic
context. Combining these insights with those of international law
scholars suggests that a switch from standards to rules will do little
more than exchange one set of challenges for another, still more
daunting, obstacle.
A. Rules vs. Standards
Rather than a contest between rules and standards, the dynamics
of the international tax regime tend to be viewed in terms of hard and
soft law.95 That distinction can be quite useful.9 6 It illuminates the
different mechanisms through which the two types of international
law influence the behavior of states97 and provides a useful vocabulary
for distinguishing between fundamentally different types of legal
instruments.98
Hard and soft law can be distinguished across three dimensions:
precision, obligation, and delegation.99 In matters of taxation, the
sovereignty-driven questions of obligation and delegation tend to steal
the limelight.100 Considered alongside such dramatic contests for
95 See Christians, supra note 30, at 325 ("Discussion in international tax literature
is increasingly using terms such as hard law, customary law, and soft law. . . .").
96 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 421 (2000) (concluding that the dichotomy of hard
and soft law allows commentators to "analyze the benefits and costs of different types
of legalization and suggest hypotheses regarding the circumstances that lead actors to
select specific forms").
97 Referring to international law as "soft" does not mean that it has no capacity to
influence state action. It may merely influence states through non-legal channels.
For example, Hathaway identifies the formal and informal mechanisms that influence
state action as "transnational legal enforcement" and "transnational collateral conse-
quences." Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of Inter-
national Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 497-512 (2005).
98 Abbott and Snidal, for example, distinguish between hard and soft law by refer-
ence to three criteria, "obligation, precision, and delegation." Abbott & Snidal, supra
note 96, at 422.
99 See generally Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG.
401 (2000) (providing a detailed analysis of each of the three characteristics).
100 See Diane M. Ring, What's at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and
the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 155, 156 (2008) ("No significant issue in interna-
tional tax can be discussed without raising the question of sovereignty. Does a particu-
lar outcome or position harm or infringe upon a nation's sovereignty? Is sovereignty
advanced by the proposed tax plan? Should a sovereign nation participate in multilat-
eral tax cooperation to solve shared problems?"). Interestingly, the preoccupation
that states have with tax sovereignty does not always lead in the same direction on the
question of obligation and delegation. The European Union currently struggles with
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power, the more technical question of precision tends to be an after-
thought. 0 1 The rules versus standards literature provides a rich set of
tools that brings precision into focus. No less important, it does so
without implying any inherent hierarchy.1 0 2
To describe the "optimal precision" of legal requirements as fall-
ing somewhere between "administrative underprecision" and "exces-
a situation in which they have obligated themselves without delegating. The result is a
situation in which the European Court ofJustice continues to strike down national tax
laws (and the states act as though they are bound to respect those decisions) but the
European Parliament cannot pass laws to solve the problem without the unanimous
agreement of E.U. member states (because they have not delegated authority). See
Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1253 (2006); Ruth Mason, Made in
America for European Tax: The Internal Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1277, 1278-82
(2008).
101 States bridle at suggestions that they shape their tax policies for the benefit of
others and display skepticism towards efforts to delegate authority to resolve intergov-
ernmental tax disputes. States tend to be very reluctant to consider commitments
binding. See generally, Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspec-
tive, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71, 82-116 (1995) (providing the history of U.S. tax treaty
overrides). States are even less willing to delegate authority to third parties. See
Abbott et al., supra note 99, at 415 ("The characteristic forms of legal delegation are
third-party dispute settlement mechanisms authorized to interpret rules and apply
them to particular facts (and therefore in effect to make new rules, at least intersti-
tially) under established doctrines of international law."). With the exception of the
recent advent of a limited amount of binding arbitration in the double tax treaty
context, states simply do not delegate the interpretation or adjudication of interna-
tional tax rules. See Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649, 689-99
(2010) (tracing the history of the inclusion of binding arbitration features in the
OECD model double tax treaty). The binding arbitration was carefully designed to
"to assuage countries' sovereignty concerns...." Hugh J. Ault, Reflections on the Role of
the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 757, 775 (2009);
see Hugh J. Ault, Improving the Resolution of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV.
137, 139 (2005) (noting that most international tax disputes are resolved pursuant to
Mutual Agreement Procedures and that "the individual case is not considered on its
merits but [as] part of a larger tradeoff between the countries").
102 By contrast, viewing legal regimes through the lens of hard and soft law can
create an expectation that soft law will-or should-blossom into hard law. See
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 96, at 422-23 ("Others justify soft law only as an interim
step toward harder and therefore more satisfactory legalization."). As a result,
through the hard versus soft law prism, the arm's length standard may seem like little
more than "a way station to harder legalization" such as formulary apportionment.
Id. at 423. The soft law label itself can become a liability. See id. ("The implication is
that soft law-law that 'falls short' on one or more of the three dimensions of legaliza-
tion-is a failure."). The rules versus standards framework, by contrast, does not sug-
gest a comparable hierarchy as between rules and standards. Each offers advantages
and disadvantages and neither is viewed as inferior to the other.
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sive regulatory rigidity" suggests both the importance of striving for
that goal and the impossibility of achieving it.103 No matter how well
tailored to a particular context, a highly specified rule is likely to be
perceived as unduly rigid in at least some cases. By the same token,
even the most elegant standard will fail to provide adequate guidance
in others.
The fundamental difference between rules and standards is the
point at which each is given content. 104 A numerical speed limit
embodies up-front content specification, while a "reasonable" speed
requirement demands a case-by-case determination.105 In that sense a
rule is a mass-produced legal instrument while a standard serves as a
skilled craftsman. A rule-by providing "an advance determination of
what conduct is permissible" that may apply to hundreds or thousands
of events-creates the potential for economies of scale.106 Of course,
like any other mass-production process, creating a rule entails signifi-
cant up-front costs.
The two primary costs are "the cost of obtaining and analyzing
information about the rule's probable impact, and the cost of secur-
ing agreement among participants in the rulemaking process." 07 A
standard minimizes lawmakers' initial outlay by, for instance, defer-
ring difficult decisions.108 Nevertheless, it offers no guarantee of
lower overall costs. Given a large number of instances in which a stan-
dard applies, the need for private parties and authorities to repeatedly
implement the standard could make it more costly over time.109
Moreover, the economies of scale that a rule offers do not come
without risk. One of the "conventional arguments against precise stat-
utory guidelines . . . stress[es] the need for flexibility for responding
103 Diver, supra note 12, at 65.
104 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
105 See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 560.
106 Id. at 560, 583.
107 Diver, supra note 12, at 73.
108 The parallels between the hard/soft law and the rules/standards distinctions
are particularly apparent when we focus on the nature of the costs they entail. See
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 96, at 434 ("A major advantage of softer forms of legaliza-
tion is their lower contracting costs. Hard legalization reduces the post-agreement
costs of managing and enforcing commitments, but adoption of a highly legalized
agreement entails significant contracting costs.").
109 An imprecise standard could, for example, spawn a large number of disputes.
See Diver, supra note 12, at 95 (offering the "staggering" number of cases challenging
INS's exercise of its discretion to adjust the status of aliens to permanent residence
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as an example of the impact
of a lack of precision).
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to changed circumstances . . . .""o In other words, not even the most
efficient production process can compensate for a change in technol-
ogy or tastes that renders a product-or a law-obsolete. In such
cases, lawmakers' up-front investment may, in retrospect, appear
foolish.
B. Rules and Standards in International Taxation
The intuitive appeal of rules is not difficult to understand. One
need only compare the indeterminacy of the arm's length standard to
the refreshing clarity of formulary apportionment to appreciate why
rules seem to be an important part of the international tax regime's
future. 1 ' Rather than asking transnational businesses and national
tax authorities to craft bespoke solutions to increasingly common allo-
cative problems, formulary apportionment promises a dependable off-
the-rack alternative.
1. Formulary Apportionment and the Costs of Consensus
Bausch & Lomb paints a compelling picture of the limits of the
arm's length standard. 1 2 The long, expensive fight over allocating
the profits derived from a product as prosaic as a contact lens does
not inspire great confidence in the arm's length standard's capacity to
address disputes regarding more complex products and services. The
opacity of the operations of financial firms, for example, has long
taxed the capacity of the extant regime.113 It seems safe to conclude
that the future holds more, not less, of that sort of complexity.
Against that backdrop, formulary apportionment's rule-dispens-
ing with the need to delve too deeply into the nature of an organiza-
tion's idiosyncratic technologies and structures-seems almost
110 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. R.Ev. 421, 481
(1987).
111 Of course, the clarity rules provide does not come without costs. If substituting
rules for standards were an easy cure for chronic ailments like those that afflict the
international tax regime, the rules versus standards debate would hardly have been
the subject of decades of sustained scholarly attention. Choosing between rules and
standards is never easy. Similar contests between rules and standards persist in all
sorts of settings. One particularly heated and long-running debate focuses on the
appropriate way of policing the behavior of public companies. See generally James J.
Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625 (2007) (con-
trasting "principles-based" and "rules-based" securities law enforcement actions).
112 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
113 See Lisa M. Nadal, Reproposed Global Dealing Regs Similar to 1998 Regs, 117 TAX
NOTES 307 (2007) (describing what is now a more-than-decade-long effort to create
regulations governing the allocation of profits of financial firms).
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inevitable. Unfortunately, embracing a rule such as formulary appor-
tionment can create as many problems as it solves. As in any other
context, while it might significantly lower post-implementation costs,
those savings could be dwarfed by increased rulemaking costs.
Even assuming the costs of designing the rule are modest, forging
consensus among states with differing interests and capacities may be
extremely difficult." 4  The growth of cross-border commerce
undoubtedly makes the notion of economies of scale appealing, but
the increasing interconnectedness that accompanies that growth also
makes achieving consensus more costly." 5 As Cass Sunstein succinctly
put it, "[s]ometimes people can agree on a standard when they can-
not agree on its specification. An incompletely specified provision
may be the best the political (orjudicial) system can do."' 1 6 The inde-
terminacy of the arm's length standard may indicate its status not
merely as a lowest-common denominator but also as a high-water
mark in political terms."' 7
2. Information Exchange and the Rigidity of Rules
The mechanisms through which information is exchanged
among national tax authorities provide another illustration of the
extent to which the international tax regime defers the specification
of content.' 1 8 It also illustrates a second pitfall of a switch from stan-
dards to rules.' 19 Not only are rules costly to construct, once brought
114 See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Alternatives for International Corporate Tax Reform, 49 TAX
L. REv. 599, 611 (1994) (arguing that structural differences among countries make it
"seem very unlikely that a consensus would develop in the foreseeable future" regard-
ing an appropriate formula by which to apportion income). Some commentators
argue that a high level of coordination is not necessary, but concede that some coor-
dination would be required. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formu-
lary Apportionment-Myths and Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax Policy by
Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-theorized Formulary Alternative 22 (Univ. of Mich.
Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 221; Empirical
Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 10-029, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1693105.
115 More transactions involving more firms in more jurisdictions inevitably means
higher rule implementation costs.
116 Sunstein, supra note 12, at 965 (emphasis omitted).
117 See William J. Wilkins & Kenneth W. Gideon, Memorandum to Congress: You
Wouldn't Like Worldwide Formula Apportionment, 65 TAX NOTES 1259, 1261 (1994) (con-
trasting the "difficulty in achieving international agreement on formula apportion-
ment and its details" against "the arm's length approach, which is capable of brief and
noncontroversial treaty expression").
118 The deferral of content specification is the hallmark of a standard. See supra
note 104 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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into existence they face the constant threat of obsolescence. Investing
heavily in a production process (i.e. a rule) may not be prudent if the
product in question is one that may soon fall out of fashion.
It is difficult to contemplate the current double-tax-treaty-based
information exchange infrastructure without acknowledging the inad-
equacy of the ad hoc information flows it generates. 120 Still, it embod-
ies the flexibility that is so prized in a standard. 121 Even though
national income taxes and the global economic landscape have
changed dramatically over the last few decades, the information
exchange provisions of treaties have not. 2 2
Had they been more precisely specified, those treaty-based mech-
anisms might now be obsolete as well as ineffective. 123 Today, it would
be short sighted to discount the possibility that wholesale changes in
the domestic laws of states currently heavily reliant on income taxes
might hobble a highly specified, rules-based information exchange
regime. 124 After all, the same organization that leads the charge for
120 That is particularly true when today's standards are compared to those that
existed in the earliest days of the international tax regime. See Dean, supra note 59, at
638-44.
121 The information exchange articles themselves change little over time. The
commentaries provide more flexibility. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. (OECD), MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL-CONDENSED
VERSION, at art. 26 (2010) (presenting both a relatively short information exchange
article (Article 26) in which a handful of words are altered and the much lengthier
commentaries on that article in which those changes, along with changes not
reflected in the article itself are described in detail). The same is true of the arm's
length standard. The standard itself has changed very little, but its interpretation has.
See supra note 33 (describing evolution of the standard over several decades).
122 Compare U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 68, at art. 26 with U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, at art. 26 (1976). Arguably,
the biggest change is the switch from the "is necessary" threshold to the newer "may
be relevant" standard. Footnote 70, supra, provides a portion of the official U.S. com-
mentary on that change, suggesting that the new language may not be as expansive as
it appears.
123 For example, U.S. tax authorities require borrowers to report not only the cash
interest they pay to lenders, but also interest that economically accrues without being
paid in cash. See I.R.S., Form 1099-OID (2011). The highly specified information
exchange provisions created during the first half of the century did not require
reporting of that deferred interest, referred to as Original Issue Discount. As a result,
even if those early agreements had not been supplanted by the modern information
exchange standard, they would not have provided today's authorities with informa-
tion comparable to the information they receive from domestic sources.
124 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 96-114 (Comm. Print
1996), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-5-96.pdf (addressing international
implications of dramatic changes in the U.S. tax system). Of course, some of the
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rules-based information exchange also extols the advantages of con-
sumption taxes over the very income taxes that the new information
exchange infrastructure would serve.12 5
Even if change were to continue to come gradually to the world's
income taxes, the impact on the proposed information exchange
architecture could be disruptive.' 2 6 In the context of domestic tax
information acquisition, administrators find themselves in a constant
battle to keep pace with changes in taxpayer behavior.' 27 It is not
difficult to understand that the more highly specified a rule becomes,
the more vulnerable it would be to even incremental changes in the
needs of participating states.'28 In other words, the switch from a
standard to a rule might merely replace the ex post costs of providing
content for a standard with the not inconsiderable costs of constant
modernization.
C. Rules, Standards, and Legitimacy
In the international context, the potency of both rules and stan-
dards derives from the push and pull generated by the principles that
underlie them. 29 The international tax regime relies on one princi-
investment in information technology infrastructure could be salvaged and repur-
posed to create a new information exchange regime. By the same token, the coopera-
tive relationships among participating states would survive that switch.
125 See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. (OECD), Consumption Taxes 5(2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/6/39495382.pdf (finding
"strong support for the view that a move in the balance of taxation towards taxes on
consumption would be likely to improve economic efficiency and increase growth").
The OECD is far from alone in advocating in favor of consumption taxes. See Warren,
supra, note 114, at 610 ("Some analysts have argued that income taxation should be
replaced by cash flow [consumption] taxation, for both individuals and corporations
... even apart from international considerations.").
126 The same would be true if a formulary apportionment regime were intro-
duced. SeeJulie Roin, Can the Income Tax be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adapting
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAx L. REv. 169, 174 (2008) ("[R]eplacing the
current international tax rules with a system of formulary taxation would entail tre-
mendous institutional and transition costs in the United States and elsewhere. Fur-
ther, achieving and maintaining the degree of legal uniformity necessary for such a
system to operate to its full potential would have its own costs." (footnote omitted)).
127 SeeJoshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2009) (showing that the IRS tax shelter reporting require-
ment has had a hard time striking a balance between underdisclosure and overdis-
closure by taxpayers).
128 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 994 ("[R]ules may badly misfire under new
conditions.").
129 Without Hart's rules of recognition, a set of obligations will not develop into a
"legal system." See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Franck echoes the impor-
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ple in particular, the benefits principle, as its primary source of
legitimacy.so
Because there is no central transnational tax authority with the
capacity to enforce either standards or rules nothing compels obedi-
ence by individual states.1 31 States participate in the international tax
regime because they choose to do so, not because they must. Of the
two reasons that states comply with international legal regimes, the
first is the more obvious. States can be expected to comply with legal
regimes when that compliance is perceived to be in their own national
interest, however that is understood. 32 More difficult to understand
is why states comply even against their own apparent interests.
One solution to that puzzle is "compliance pull."1 33 Compliance
pull refers to the capacity of a regime to "secure compliance when, as
in the international system, there are no other compliance-inducing
mechanisms." 134 Why, for instance, does a state accept an adverse rul-
ing of an international body? There may be circumstances in which it
is clear that the short-term burden of doing so will be more than offset
tance of such "secondary" rules to the success of international law. See Thomas M.
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 752 (1988) ("Pri-
mary rules of obligation that lack adherence to a system of secondary rules of process
are mere ad hoc reciprocal arrangements."). Franck and Sunstein both make the
observation that rules divorced from principles are less likely to be successful. Sound
principles provide the foundation that makes rules-and standards-strong. See Sun-
stein, supra note 12, at 966 (" [R]ules are justified by principles, usually political or
moral in character"). Posner and Ehrlich make a similar observation about the rela-
tionship between rules and principles. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 12, at 260
("Properly understood, 'principles' are simply the considerations that are relevant in
determining the content of a rule.").
130 The benefits principle plays a critical role in persuading states to comply with
international tax rules. In other words, it represents a means by which "other rules of
the system" can be "assessed, and in virtue of which the rules constitute a single sys-
tem." HART, supra note 1, at 233.
131 The OECD comes closest to playing the role of a World Tax Organization. To
the extent it influences state action, it does so by generating international norms. See
Christians, supra note 17, at 4 ("The OECD describes itself as a 'market leader in
developing standards and guidelines,' and policy norms it develops have worldwide
impact.").
132 See Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 545, 547
(2004) (observing that states will abide by rules that do them a short-term disservice
in order to secure greater long-term benefits). Such incentives are the explanation
typically offered for the remarkable success of the double tax treaty network. See supra
note 28. States offer concessions with regard to their taxation of foreign residents in
order to secure equivalent benefits for their own residents. See infra note 169.
133 Franck, supra note 129, at 713.
134 Id. at 706.
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by long-term benefits of membership in that body.' 3 5 In other cases,
legitimacy may play the more important role in cultivating commit-
ment to a regime.'3 6 Simply put, regimes that are perceived to be
legitimate elicit more compliance than those that are not.
Legitimacy can be disaggregated into input and output legiti-
macy.'3 7 Thomas Franck identifies input legitimacy as "that quality of
a rule which derives from a perception on the part of those to whom it
is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right pro-
cess."13 8 In the absence of a global legislature with the capacity to
supply its imprimatur, perhaps the best means of satisfying Franck's
procedural threshold-thereby generating input legitimacy-is to
anchor a rule or standard in a principle that itself possesses legiti-
macy.1 39 Conversely, even the most finely wrought rules or protean
standards can lose the benefit of the pull provided by that borrowed
legitimacy if they fail to "adhere" to their host principle.140
Congruence between a regime's objective and its real-world
impact generates a second type of legitimacy referred to as output
legitimacy. If a law succeeds in meeting its objectives-whether limit-
ing noise pollution, reducing crime or promoting investment-it may
command a respect that is independent of its origins. International
legal regimes and institutions can acquire legitimacy in the same way.
For example, the perceived success or failure of International Mone-
tary Fund efforts to resolve financial crises will either burnish or
detract from its output legitimacy.141
135 See supra note 132.
136 See infra note 137.
137 See FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE 2 (1999) (distinguishing "input-ori-
ented authenticity" and "output-oriented authenticity" as two distinct sources of legiti-
macy); Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY
265 (Roger B. Porter ed., 2001) ("The legitimacy of institutions is affected both on
the 'input' side-in particular, through procedures for accountability-and on the
'output' side, in terms of effectiveness.").
138 Franck, supra note 129, at 706 (emphasis omitted). Although Franck uses the
concept of "input legitimacy," he does not use that label.
139 Franck describes an important role for what he sees as the international
equivalent of H.L.A. Hart's secondary rules of recognition. He argues that such rules
can help lend legitimacy to international legal regimes while "[p]rimary rules of obli-
gation that lack adherence to a system of secondary rules of process are mere ad hoc
reciprocal arrangements." Franck, supra note 129, at 752.
140 Franck uses the term "adherence" to describe phenomenon of a legal provi-
sion being firmly rooted in an underlying principle. See Franck, supra note 129, at
751-52.
141 See Keohane & Nye, supra note 137, at 286.
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For the international tax regime, the switch from standards to
rules will generate neither type of legitimacy. Instead, as described in
Part III, that shift threatens to diminish the international tax regime's
legitimacy. Formulary apportionment and enhanced information
exchange both sacrifice adherence to the benefits principle-the bed-
rock principle of the international tax regime-in a misguided pur-
suit of greater output legitimacy. Unfortunately, as described below,
the rise of rules is more likely to reduce than increase the output legit-
imacy of the international tax regime.
III. THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
On its own, transforming a standards-based international tax
regime into one that relies more heavily on rules will accomplish little.
More urgent is closing the growing gap between the architecture of
the international tax regime and its basic norm. That hardly seems
possible so long as those rules continue to rely on a principle
designed to solve the quaintly outdated problem of double taxa-
tion.142 This Part begins by tracing the benefits principle's roots and
then explores its role in producing legitimacy traps.
A. The Benefits Principle
The embarrassment of riches that governments once struggled to
tame no longer exists.' 43 Today, states find themselves in a world
turned upside down. Too little tax revenue, not too much, leaves gov-
ernments at a loss. While it would be difficult to overstate the histori-
cal significance of the improbable compromise embodied in the
benefits principle-that states will refrain from asserting claims to tax
revenues that another state earns-"nowadays the decisive issue is . . .
the enforcement problem inherent in double non-taxation." 44
Simply put, collecting taxes is now the challenge states face, not
refraining from collecting them. Fabricating a solution to this funda-
mentally different problem demands an equally unorthodox
approach to allocating tax revenues. As detailed in Part IV, if a state
contributes to a solution it should be rewarded; if it exacerbates the
problem, it should suffer.' 45
142 See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
143 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1631-48 (describing consequences of declining
taxing capability of developed countries).
144 THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL EcONov OF INTERNATIONAL TAx GOVERNANCE
200 (2008).
145 In other words, a state's investment in a modern tax infrastructure must be
given its due alongside its investments in railroads.
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1. Legitimacy and the International Tax Regime
The benefits principle dates to the origins of the modern interna-
tional tax regime and represents the key compromise that has pro-
pelled its success for so many years.14 6 Like relative newcomers such
as capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality, the benefits
principle seeks to avoid disproportionate burdens on cross-border
economic activity.14 7  Unlike those esoteric concepts, the benefits
principle delivers a message that is easy to understand and that has
been widely embraced.1 48
146 The benefits principle emerged in a world that bears little resemblance to one
in which even the most readily identifiable of national businesses could change pass-
ports not once, but twice in little more than a decade. See Chris V. Nicholson, Chinese
Carmaker Geely Completes Acquisition of Volvo from Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at B3(noting that Ford bought Volvo in 1999 and then sold it to a Chinese competitor in
2010). The birth of the modern benefits-principle-based international tax regime
could be dated to the issuance of a report published under the auspices of the League
of Nations. See COMM. OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS ON DOUBLE TAXATION & TAX EVASION,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, DOUBLE TAXATION AND TAX EVASION 5-9 (1927), available
at www.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/League/LeagueTech Experts.pdf. That
report contained four model conventions, including the Convention for the Preven-
tion of Double Taxation. See id. at 10. In the post-World War I environment, inter-
national trade was important enough to support the creation of the generous cross-
border investment subsidy known as the foreign tax credit. See Graetz & O'Hear,
supra note 32, at 1046-47 (describing the reasons for the "generosity" embodied in
the foreign tax credit). Nevertheless, cross-border transactions were limited to the
purchase of goods rather than the companies that produced them.
147 The benefits principle might be thought of as a forerunner of the later neutral-
ities. While those neutrality principles draw subtle distinctions among the ways in
which cross-border activity may be disadvantaged over purely domestic activity, the
benefits principle seeks only to avoid double (or triple) taxation by the jurisdictions
that host, facilitate, and generate cross-border investments. The neutrality principles
emerged much later. See Fadi Shaheen, International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations,
27 VA. TAX REV. 203, 205 (2007) (describing the emergence of an array of interna-
tional tax neutrality principles beginning in the 1960s).
148 Shaheen describes the lack of consensus that prevails even among specialists
regarding the five international tax neutrality principles. See id. at 207-08. His analy-
sis also demonstrates that the principles do not appear to be particularly well under-
stood. See id. at 239 (questioning the view of "CEN as a doctrine that requires the
return on capital to be subject to the same total tax rate regardless of the location of
the investment (residence-based taxation)"). Michael Knoll reaches a similarly pessi-
mistic conclusion regarding the failure of international tax commentators to fully
grasp the significance of the neutrality principles. See Michael Knoll, Reconsidering
International Tax Neutrality 42 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn/abstract=1407198.
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The benefits principle operates by allocating taxing jurisdiction
to the state that fosters the economic activity giving rise to the tax. 49
It provides that states "earn" tax revenues by, for example, building
roads, providing schools, or nurturing capital formation.1 50 The ben-
efits principle offered a robust solution to the "original problem of
international taxation-double taxation" which amounted to "the dis-
tributive problem of sharing the international tax base ....
The benefits principle, or the "economic allegiance" principle as
experts of the day sometimes referred to it, reflected its era.152 It envi-
sions a clear link between the services states provide and the economic
activity that occurs within its borders that would seem "delusional"
today.153 The benefits principle presupposes that by providing "infra-
structure or education, as well as more specific government policies
such as keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low" ajuris-
diction hosting foreign investment becomes entitled to collect tax "in
the sense that the host country's government bears some of the costs
of providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the
income."' 5 4
When the international tax regime focused on curbing double
taxation, the benefits principle provided both output and input legiti-
macy. Just as the World Health Organization accrues legitimacy by
successfully addressing global health issues, the success of the interna-
tional tax regime in eradicating double taxation endowed it with out-
put legitimacy.155 At the same time, the seamless link between the
benefits principle and the regime's allocation of revenues provided
149 The assumption is that "the taxpayer has an obligation founded on ethical
principles to pay for the benefits conferred by the host country" or that "the obliga-
tion to pay income tax at the source arises under an implied contract between the
taxpayer and the host country imposing the tax." Kaufman, supra note 8, at 184.
150 See id. at 185 ("Under a strict benefit rule, the country in which a product is
produced could impose a charge for the governmental goods and services benefiting
the producer . . . .").
151 RIXEN, supra note 144, at 200.
152 See Kaufman, supra note 8, at 196 (explaining "economic allegiance" concept).
153 William B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Spar-
ing, and Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 349, 370 (2007) (refer-
ring to a modern "system defined by territorial principles of source").
154 Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 521.
155 See Keohane & Nye, supra note 137, at 286 ("The World Health Organization's
eradication of smallpox gave the WHO substantial legitimacy for being effective in
dealing with global health problems, whereas its slowness in focusing on AIDs may
have had the opposite effect.").
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the international tax regime with a high level of derivative input
legitimacy. 156
2. Legitimacy's Decline
In the many decades since their introduction, a long list of con-
temporary phenomena such as electronic commerce "have helped to
render archaic. . . international. . . tax arrangements and policies."15 7
The benefits principle is certainly one of the casualties of that disrup-
tion. As a descriptive matter, when "multinational firms ... shift nom-
inal income to low tax jurisdictions while still reaping the benefits
of . .. jurisdictions where the business is headquartered" the already
fragile link between public services and tax revenues that animates the
benefits principle may be severed. 15 8 Unable to enjoy the fruits of
their efforts, states lash out, responding by departing from "traditional
tax policy principles."1 5 9
The product of that cycle of private behavior and public response
is a legitimacy trap. States struggle to nurture a vital international tax
regime, but succeed only in accelerating a decline in input and output
legitimacy. Output legitimacy declines even as states labor to plug
holes in the regime. 160 Responding to crises by departing from the
benefits principle script, states sacrifice input legitimacy in the pursuit
156 See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
157 Graetz, supra note 13, at 1417 (listing e-commerce, derivatives, e-money and
tax havens as part of the new reality that challenges the capacity of the international
tax regime).
158 Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet
is Changing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 380 (2002).
159 See id. at 390-95 ("[T]he United States and other OECD member States have,
despite assertions that traditional tax policy principles must be preserved, moved
toward an economic presence test for cross-border e-commerce income tax purposes,
a significant departure from traditional international tax principles that focused on
the need for a physical presence . . . ."). Cockfield concludes that this change contrib-
utes to a dynamic in which "profits are diverted away from the countries that have a
meaningful connection to the profit-making activities (i.e., the country where an e-
commerce business is based, the country where the intangible assets were developed
or the country where the e-commerce good or service is purchased)." Id. at 395.
160 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1579-86 (describing impact of U.S. decision to
forgo the taxation of portfolio interest earned by nonresident investors on capacity of
other states to impose such a tax). For those who view the benefits principle as
mandatory rather than permissive-i.e. a state must, rather than may-collect the
revenues allocated to it, the magnitude of the output legitimacy decline is particularly
stark. The U.S. decision to repeal its tax on portfolio interest was not consistent with
a mandatory view of the benefits principle.
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of output legitimacy. They run a grave risk of winding up with
neither.16'
B. Legitimacy Traps and Hypocrisy
The harm done by the persistence of "outdated" or "inadequate"
principles can be significant without being apparent. 162 If a provision
of international law fails to adhere to a legitimate basic norm while
also failing to be effective, it will enjoy neither input nor output legiti-
macy. The result can all too easily be a downward spiral in which a
dearth of legitimacy (specifically, input legitimacy) elicits only insin-
cere acceptance from states, further diminishing the regime's legiti-
macy (particularly its output legitimacy).163
The problem could also be described more succinctly: the ten-
sion created by an inadequate principle makes hypocrites of even the
most stalwart supporters of the international tax regime. A cynic
might, for instance, dismiss the OECD's success in persuading tax
havens to sign information exchange agreements as the sort of hollow
victory one must expect when dealing with rogue states. 164 Unfortu-
nately, a similarly shallow commitment can be observed in even those
most dedicated to information exchange.165
161 Even if those new features allow states to collect additional revenues, the nega-
tive impact their departure from traditional tax policy principles may mean no net
gain in legitimacy.
162 See Graetz, supra note 13, at 1362.
163 See Hathaway, supra note 97, at 517-19 (noting that when the costs of noncom-
pliance are low states may willingly commit to an international regime with no inten-
tion of complying). A particularly jarring example of the perils of that type of
insincerity is the tendency of regimes with poor human rights and environmental
track records to commit to human rights and environmental treaties as a means of
camouflaging their lack of actual compliance. See id. at 514-19.
164 See Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and
the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REv. 125, 147-49 (2009) (doubting
the capacity of the OECD effort to transform commitment into full-fledged coopera-
tion); Michael J. McIntyre, How to End the Charade of Information Exchange, 56 TAX
NOTES INT'L 255, 255 (2009) ("Tax haven countries that agree to this ineffective TIEA
are provided with an undeserved patina of respectability. They have been eager to
sign up, and most have done so."); Lee A. Sheppard, Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Part 4:
Ineffectual Information Sharing, 53 TAx NOTES INT'L 1139, 1140 (2009) ("Overall, the
agreement is more a public relations document than a tool of tax administration. It
allows banking havens to make a show of cooperation while going about their essen-
tial business of selling tax evasion services to residents of rich countries.").
165 See McIntyre, supra note 164, at 259 (concluding that at the same time it pur-
sues bilateral information exchange to curb offshore tax evasion, "it has an active
program encouraging foreign tax cheats to invest in the United States").
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The United States has long been a strong supporter of the inter-
national regime in general and of information exchange in particu-
lar.166 In the wake of the UBS tax evasion scandal, for instance, the
United States has strenuously bargained for improved information
exchange with Switzerland.' 67 At the same time, the United States has
assertively broken with the cooperative inter-state ethos of the benefits
principle. Instead of observing the benefits-driven notion of informa-
tion reciprocity, U.S. authorities have embraced a new, unilateral
approach.
Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly come to
rely on qualified intermediaries for the collection of extraterritorial
tax information. A qualified intermediary is a private firm deputized
by U.S. tax authorities to collect taxes imposed on U.S. income earned
by foreign individuals and businesses.' 6 8 It is a quirk of the interna-
tional tax regime that relatively few cross-border payments are taxed at
the statutory tax rate.' 69 As a result, the qualified intermediary rou-
166 The United States set the cornerstone of the international tax regime in place
by enacting the foreign tax credit. See supra note 146. It stood at the vanguard of the
spread of the double tax treaty. Britain concluded its first comprehensive double tax
treaty with the United States in 1945. SeeJohn F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Neces-
sary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (1999). The United States also laid the groundwork for the
current wave of information exchange agreements by reviving the concept in the
1980s. See Dean, supra note 59, at 650-53.
167 The United States and Switzerland recently entered into a protocol to their
bilateral double tax treaty that provides for expanded information exchange. See
Press Release, Treasury Dep't, United States, Switzerland Sign Agreement to Bolster
Tax Information Exchange (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg297.aspx ("The protocol revises the existing U.S.-
Switzerland income tax treaty to allow for the exchange of information for income tax
purposes to the full extent permitted by Article 26 of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Income Tax Convention.").
168 A qualified intermediary is defined under the regulations as a "foreign finan-
cial institution" or a similar entity "that is a party to a withholding agreement with the
IRS." Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1 (e) (5) (ii) (as amended in 2007).
169 The high statutory rate serves merely as a penalty default encouraging taxpay-
ers to identify themselves in order to qualify for a lower rate. SeeJones, supra note
166, at 3 (concluding that the "high withholding taxes on nonresidents" are intended
to make those nonresidents, and by extension their states of residence, to "want trea-
ties" to reduce those rates). In the United States that nominal rate on dividends,
interest, and similar periodic payments is thirty percent. I.R.C. §§ 1441-42 (2006).
Historically, one benefit of the scheme is that in order to secure the lower nonstatu-
tory rate, a nonresident must generally provide documentation establishing his or her
entitlement to that rate. Tax authorities can provide that information-specifying
the taxpayer's identity and residence-to tax authorities in the recipient's residence
jurisdiction. Having received information about the income of one of its residents in
this roundabout manner, that jurisdiction may then impose a tax on the investment
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tinely assesses the eligibility of foreign taxpayers receiving interest or
dividends from within the United States for rates below that statutory
thirty percent withholding tax rate.170 Only after it examines the doc-
umentation proving that a French recipient is eligible for the reduced
rates provided by the double tax treaty between the United States and
France, for instance, will it ensure that the appropriate amount of tax
is remitted to U.S. authorities.17'
Privatizing a process that had previously been carried out directly
by U.S. tax authorities has distinct advantages for the United States.
As is often true, privatization offers the possibility of significant opera-
tional savings. Here, the savings may be more substantial than in a
typical privatization scenario.' 7 2  That is because qualified
intermediaries not only perform a complex, labor-intensive task on
behalf of U.S. tax authorities, they do so without compensation. 7 3
Although uncompensated, those services are nonetheless remu-
nerative. 174 Clients of qualified intermediaries gain the benefit of
access to U.S. financial markets without sacrificing their anonymity.175
income of its resident. The rise of qualified intermediaries disrupts the flow of infor-
mation from nonresident taxpayers to their home jurisdiction.
170 The specific obligations of the qualified intermediary are specified by each
intermediary's withholding agreement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(iii)(B) (as
amended in 2007) ("[T]he agreement shall specify the type of certifications and doc-
umentation upon which the qualified intermediary may rely to ascertain the classifica-
tion . . . and status ... of beneficial owners and payees who receive payments collected
by the qualified intermediary and, if necessary, entitlement to the benefits of a
reduced rate under an income tax treaty.").
171 See id.
172 Privatization can enhance economic efficiency by imposing market discipline
on decision makers. See Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A
World Bank Perspective, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. S23, S25-27 (1992).
173 Rather than receiving information with respect to individual taxpayers, quali-
fied intermediary withholding agreements may provide for the qualified intermediary
to provide aggregate, rather than individualized information regarding nonresident
taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(iii)(B) (as amended in 2007). In effect,
U.S. tax authorities receive a convenient summary, sparing them the burden of
processing the information themselves.
174 As Michael McIntyre puts it, being a qualified intermediary benefits financial
intermediaries by making it possible for them to "handle anonymously the invest-
ments in the United States by foreign tax cheats." McIntyre, supra note 164, at 259
("Hundreds of billions of dollars flow into the United States under this system.").
175 Qualified intermediaries need not "disclose the identity of beneficial owners
and payees" when those payees are nonresidents. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1 (e) (5) (iii) (B)
(as amended in 2007). As a result, U.S. tax authorities do not receive that informa-
tion and cannot exchange that information with their foreign counterparts. To some,
the simultaneous rise of the qualified intermediary and enhanced information
exchange smacks of "brazen hypocrisy." See Mcintyre, supra note 164, at 255. At a
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That irresistible combination generates business for qualified
intermediaries while producing more privacy and higher returns for
foreign investors and more foreign investment and tax revenues along
with lower administrative costs for the United States.
The result appears to be a win-win-win for the United States, qual-
ified intermediaries, and their clients. The primary losers are those
states that have agreed to exchange information with the United
States. Because the qualified intermediary receives and reviews the
documentation that entitles our hypothetical French taxpayer to a low
treaty withholding rate, the United States does not possess and cannot
provide that documentation to France.' 76 In a desperate bid to bol-
ster compliance (output legitimacy) the United States sacrificed a
measure of adherence to the benefits principle (input legitimacy) by
creating a unilateral extraterritorial information acquisition
mechanism.' 77
The UBS scandal that followed may represent the nadir of the
resulting legitimacy trap. 78 As a participant in the qualified interme-
diary program, UBS assumed the role once filled by states bound by
information exchange obligations.' 79 As has become clear, UBS
breached those obligations in spectacular fashion. 80 Without the
derivative input legitimacy supplied by the benefits principle the risks
of such failures increase.' 8 '
minimum, the rise of the qualified intermediary has had a pernicious effect on its
ability to satisfy its information exchange obligations.
176 Whether intentional or the result of an oversight, that result is starkly at odds
with the U.S. commitment to information exchange.
177 The benefits principle encourages unilateral extraterritorial information
acquisition, but such unilateral efforts clash with the universal nature of the claim to
extraterritorial tax information that is implicit in the benefits principle. See infra text
accompanying note 208.
178 See Statement of Facts at 3, United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-CR-60099-
ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. June 19, 2008), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/fls/Press
Releases/Attachments/080619-01.Statementoffacts.pdf (describing efforts of UBS
employees to assist wealthy clients in circumventing the qualified intermediary regime
to evade U.S. income taxes).
179 See id. at 1 (describing obligations of UBS under qualified intermediary
program).
180 See id. at 4.
181 The United States has worked to compensate for the absence of compliance
pull by introducing additional incentives to ensure foreign financial firms provide
U.S. authorities with extraterritorial tax information. See Niels Jensen, Note, How to
Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Evasion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1823, 1849-52 (2010) (describing the new U.S. withholding tax intro-
duced in 2010 as a lever to extract extraterritorial tax information for U.S. tax
authorities).
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However profound the weaknesses of the aging information
exchange standard, they nevertheless draw less attention than a scan-
dal involving smuggling diamonds into the United States in a tooth-
paste tube.182 Few appreciate the degree to which reliance on
qualified intermediaries compromises U.S. information exchange
obligations, but anyone can understand such malfeasance on the part
of a U.S. private (fiscal) contractor. As a result, even if reliance on
qualified intermediaries manages to boost U.S. tax revenues, it tar-
nishes the international tax regime's output legitimacy. The result is a
vicious circle of declining input and output legitimacy.
C. Neither Rules nor Standards
The simplest conclusion that can be drawn from the UBS episode
is that replacing standards with rules is no silver bullet for the interna-
tional tax regime's input and output legitimacy deficit. Even without
scandalous headlines, the qualified intermediary mechanism com-
bines greater precision with less legitimacy. Ultimately, neither rules
nor standards address the root problem: the benefits principle invites
the United States to prioritize its own collection efforts over coopera-
tive enforcement.'83 Pursuant to that principle, the U.S. share of tax
revenues is merely a function of its contribution to global economic
growth, not its contribution to global tax cooperation.
1. Into the Legitimacy Trap
The benefits principle does not encourage states to cooperate by
investing in extraterritorial enforcement assistance.' 8 4 Instead, states
treat the lost input legitimacy that comes with the embrace of unilat-
eral enforcement efforts as a cost of boosting output legitimacy.
Unfortunately, the dearly bought output legitimacy often turns out to
be illusory.' 85 Formulary apportionment illustrates the way in which
the benefits principle creates those legitimacy traps. Simply put, it
forces states to choose between input and output legitimacy, ulti-
mately leaving them with neither.
182 See Statement of Facts, supra note 178, at 4.
183 The qualified intermediary strategy does precisely this. It maximizes compli-
ance with U.S. tax rules by sacrificing U.S. capacity to provide extraterritorial tax
information to its information exchange partners. See McIntyre, supra note 164, at
258-59. Faced with budget shortfalls and forced to choose between its domestic
spending priorities and a desire to be a good citizen by embracing the spirit (as well
as the letter) of its information exchange commitments, how could it do otherwise?
184 See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
185 See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
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Implicitly acknowledging states' reluctance to invest in extraterri-
torial enforcement assistance, the Avi-Yonah and Clausing formulary
apportionment proposal emphasizes the virtues of its relatively parsi-
monious consumption of information.'18 Particularly under the sin-
gle factor variant they identify as most desirable-sales serving as that
single factor 87-formulary apportionment consumes a remarkably
small amount of extraterritorial tax information. 88 That feature
would make it relatively straightforward for a committed state to com-
ply with-and for other states to assist and monitor compliance with-
such a rule.189
To appreciate the risks and benefits of this approach, it is helpful
to compare it to an earlier Avi-Yonah proposal. 190 Like the 2007 pro-
posal, its predecessor offers greater precision as compared to the pre-
vailing arm's length standard.19 1 Nevertheless, the 1994 rule is quite
different from its 2007 counterpart.192 Where possible, it calls for
profits to be allocated in accordance with arm's length prices, deter-
mined by reference to transactions between wholly unrelated par-
186 See supra note 78. Given the difficulty the United States and other developed
countries have had acquiring tax information from abroad, efficient use of informa-
tion is important. See Dean, supra note 59, at 663-64 (suggesting that reducing U.S.
dependence on extraterritorial tax information might provide an alternative solution
to the U.S. extraterritorial tax information deficit).
187 See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 15, at 12 ("Sales would be determined on
a destination basis: that is, they would be based on the location of the customer rather
than the location of production.").
188 See supra note 78.
189 As long as it is possible to determine the location of each multinational's sales,
allocating global tax revenues becomes child's play. Of course, its simplicity could
provide wayward states with a roadmap to manipulating the system's results.
190 In 1994, Avi-Yonah published a proposal for the simplification of the interna-
tional tax system that suggested replacing the corporate arm's length regime with a
formulary approach. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at 1347-48.
191 Since "[r]ules may be simple or complex," both the 1994 and 2007 proposals
may fairly be described as rules. Sunstein, supra note 12, at 962.
A law could say, for example, that no one under eighteen may drive. It
could be somewhat more complex, saying that people under eighteen may
not drive unless they pass certain special tests. Or it could be quite complex,
creating a formula for deciding who may drive. It might look, for example,
to age, performance on a written examination, and performance on a driv-
ing test.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
192 Avi-Yonah is careful to describe his 1994 formulary apportionment proposal as
a close analogue of the existing arm's length standard. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 6, at
1346-49. Formulary apportionment could be said to elevate a particular expression
of the arm's length standard to become a substitute for that standard. See id.
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ties.' 93 Next, it allocates a portion of global tax revenues in
accordance with the unique economic functions performed by each
subdivision of the multinational' 94 and then divides the balance
among jurisdictions according to a multi-factor formula.19 5
The 1994 proposal adheres more closely to the contours of the
benefits principle.' 96 For example, the 1994 rule allocates revenues in
accordance with the unique economic rents attributable to each juris-
diction.197 That feature makes it a far better embodiment of the ben-
efits principle" than any formula based entirely on surrogate
measures of a state's economic contribution such as sales.' 99
193 See id. at 1341 (concluding that "it has become increasingly clear that in a large
number of cases involving MNEs, it is not possible to find even the roughly compara-
ble transactions required to apply" those techniques).
194 See id. at 1347-48 ("[A] functional analysis of the portions of the MNE in each
jurisdiction should be made, and returns should be allocated to each function ....
The functional analysis should include the allocation of rents to the jurisdiction fur-
nishing the basis for such rents (e.g., natural resources or a cheap labor pool).").
195 See id. at 1348 ("[T]he most likely solution in the case of manufacturing MNEs
would appear to be a division of the residual among all of the jurisdictions in which
the MNE operates . . . based equally on the MNE's tangible assets and sales . . . .").
196 Unfortunately, that adherence-and the input legitimacy it generates-comes
at a price. Quite simply, it asks more of participating states. While locating economic
rents within particular jurisdictions would obviously provide a more accurate assess-
ment of economic allegiance than merely identifying the location of customers, it
would also be more difficult. Advances in technology make the process called for by
the 1994 proposal-allocating economic rents and so on-increasingly difficult. See
Jack M. Mintz, National Tax Policy and Global Competition, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1285,
1289 (2001) (" [E]conomic rents increasingly are related to services and technological
innovation that is not tied to a location.").
197 See supra note 194.
198 See Barker, supra note 153, at 377 (concluding that allocating jurisdiction to
tax in accordance with locational economic rents is "consistent with the just allocation
of the income tax base among nations. The origin of the income is the country that
produced the value that gave rise to the income").
199 It is not difficult to link a factor such as sales to the economic benefit concept.
Sales simply becomes a proxy for the jurisdiction's contribution to global economic
activity and for the governmental efforts underlying them. See Avi-Yonah & Clausing,
supra note 15, at 13 ("Under an FA system ... the share that is taxed by the national
jurisdiction depends on the fraction of a firm's economic activity that occurs in a
particular country. In the case of a sales-based definition, the measure of economic
activity ... focuses on the demand side of market value."). Nevertheless, relative sales
can be determined by a host of factors unrelated to a jurisdiction's contributions to
productive economic activity. For example, a state that spends beyond its means by
running a current-account deficit (as the United States has for the past forty years)
would a collect disproportionate share of global tax revenues in a manner wholly
incompatible with the benefits principle. See David Stockman, Four Deformations of the
Apocalypse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at WK9. Avi-Yonah and Clausing respond to
assertions that formulary apportionment is arbitrary by noting that the current regime
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Formulary apportionment's precision brings the risk of a legiti-
macy trap into stark relief. Particularly in its purest form, formulary
apportionment would adhere only loosely to the benefits principle,
producing a dearth of input legitimacy. Output legitimacy might
increase along with precision, but, as the UBS scandal illustrates, it
mightjust as easily fall. 2 0 0 Trading input legitimacy for the mere hope
of output legitimacy is no way to break free of a legitimacy trap.
2. Precision Without Legitimacy
Formulary apportionment remains, as yet, just a proposal. By
contrast, over the past decade, enhanced information exchange has
become a prominent feature of the international tax regime. Unsur-
prisingly, enhanced information exchange has failed to provide the
legitimacy the international tax regime increasingly lacks.
The recent spate of information exchange agreements appears to
represent an improvement over the existing information exchange
infrastructure, but on closer scrutiny that superiority dissipates. 201
Compared with the information exchange provision included in a typ-
ical double tax treaty, information exchange agreements articulate
the rights and obligations of each party with greater precision. 202
Unfortunately, that increased precision generates neither input nor
output legitimacy.203
The OECD model information exchange agreement specifies
that one party may request "information held by banks, other finan-
cial institutions, and any person acting in an agency or fiduciary
capacity including nominees and trustees" from its counterparty. 204
is equally arbitrary. See Avi-Yonah & Clausing, supra note 15, at 19. They concede,
however, that the arbitrariness of the current regime is a flaw of execution rather than
design. See id.
200 The precision offered by rules may merely provide private actors with the tools
to exploit the regime. To the extent that they know precisely which questions author-
ities will ask, they can more easily mold their behavior to produce favorable results.
201 The apparent superiority is partly a function of the tendency to distinguish
among international rules as hard or soft law and to view hard law as superior to soft
law. See Christians, supra note 30, at 332.
202 Underscoring the confusion that exists regarding rules and standards in the
international tax regime, the OECD refers to the enhanced precision produced by
the new wave of information agreements as "standards on transparency and exchange
of information." OECD, supra note 16, 1 11.
203 The OECD has made an effort to enhance the input legitimacy of its informa-
tion exchange initiative that is attributable to its narrow membership by working with
nonmembers. Its model information exchange agreement was produced in conjunc-
tion with eleven nonmember states. See OECD, supra note 75, 1 2.
204 Id. at art. 5(4)(a).
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From the point of view of a tax administrator seeking extraterritorial
tax information, the specificity of that language has an understanda-
ble appeal. 205 It provides a clear contrast with the vague double tax
treaty alternative. 206 Rather than a standard that leaves open the
question of exactly what information each party may request from the
other, it specifically identifies the information held by banks and
other financial institutions that falls within its scope.
Of course, the apparent advantages of the rule over the standard
mean little without the output or input legitimacy needed to give it
life. Indeed, enhanced information exchange has elicited the same
insincerity from tax havens that the United States exhibited with the
qualified intermediary mechanism. 207 The problem again lies not in
the rule itself, but in the relationship between the rule and the bene-
fits principle.
The benefits principle ensures that states' commitment to satisfy-
ing their information exchange obligations will not affect the rewards
allocated to them. 20s As a result neither those states at the center of
the international tax regime (here, the United States) nor those on
205 Even the fortified language of the new information exchange agreements does
not rival that of the information exchange mechanisms initially advanced by the
League of Nations. See Dean, supra note 59, at 637-49.
206 See supra text accompanying note 68.
207 Assuming that tax havens do not have a genuine desire to shed their tax haven
status, there are two ways to explain the willingness of tax havens to embrace informa-
tion exchange agreements. The first is that they have done so strategically in order to
gain a veneer of respectability. See supra notes 163-164. Alternatively, information
exchange agreements may be little more than cross-border contracts of adhesion.
The power imbalance between tax havens and OECD member states may induce tax
havens to agree to terms that they do not have the technical wherewithal to satisfy. See
infra note 213. The result in each case is that relatively strong parties manage to
secure the existence of a rule in spite of the existence of a determined, but over-
matched, opposition. Sunstein describes a similar phenomenon in the legislative con-
text, in which a pronounced power imbalance makes the creation of a rule more
rather than less likely. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1013 ("It follows that we are
likely to find rules when one group of interests is well-organized or otherwise power-
ful and when its adversaries are not.").
208 The benefits principle does not link a state's entitlement to a portion of global
tax revenues to its extrajurisdictional enforcement expenditures. Accordingly, the
model information exchange agreement makes no connection between the duties it
imposes and a state's share of global tax revenues. The model agreement does pro-
vide for the possibility of the reimbursement of incidental costs, but it does nothing
close to elevating a state's enforcement efforts to the same status as its contribution to
generating economic income. See OECD, supra note 75, at art. 9.
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the periphery (tax havens) feel much of a push to live up to their
information exchange obligations. 2 0 9
The resulting insincerity-and the inevitable contrast between
the information each state is nominally entitled to receive and will
actually consume-reduces output legitimacy. Similarly, the extent to
which information acquisition has become a unilateral, rather than
reciprocal, exercise gives the lie to enhanced information exchange's
claim of derivative input legitimacy. 210 The benefits principle presup-
poses that the U.S. right to collect and consume extraterritorial tax
information is universal, a corollary of each state's right to collect the
taxes that flow from the benefits it provides. By highlighting the
extent to which information exchange is a one way street, enhanced
information exchange merely underscores the distance between the
benefits principle and today's extraterritorial tax information acquisi-
tion infrastructure.
IV. OVERHAULING THE BAsIc RULE
Neither rules nor standards can free the international tax regime
from the legitimacy trap created by the benefits principle. Without
first transforming the benefits principle, rules such as formulary
apportionment and enhanced information exchange will not find sus-
tained success. Whatever degree of precision best suits particular fea-
tures of the international tax regime, its success hinges on legitimacy.
Without a modern international tax principle, that legitimacy will
remain elusive, no matter how creative the architects of international
tax policy prove to be.
A. Benefits and Burdens
The benefits principle does not clearly articulate the obligations
that states owe one another.2 1' Instead, the benefits principle focuses
on each state's entitlements, only implicitly recognizing a state's obli-
209 See McIntyre, supra note 164, at 255-56 (concluding that both the U.S. and tax
havens affirmatively choose to flout their information exchange obligations).
210 The profound differences between the tax systems employed by states that seek
extraterritorial tax information from tax havens and those employed by the havens
themselves reinforce the input legitimacy problem illustrated by the qualified inter-
mediary mechanism. Simply put, even if the United States had access to the informa-
tion now kept at bay by qualified intermediaries, havens often have no use for it. A
state with no comprehensive income tax will have no use for much of the information
generated by enhanced information exchange. See Marshall J. Langer, The Case for
Limited Revenue-Sharing Tax Arrangements, 40 TAX NOTES INT'L 641, 648-49 (2005).
211 Specifically, the benefits principle tells states what share of global tax revenues
they may collect. It does not tell states what they should and should not do to help
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gations as a corollary of its rights. One consequence is that the bene-
fits principle provides no direct incentive for states-the United States
being no exception-to operationalize the ideals embodied in a com-
mitment to information exchange. 212
The benefits and burdens principle offers an alternative to the
benefits principle that explicitly recognizes states' obligation to sup-
port extrajurisdictional enforcement. By doing so, it aligns the inter-
ests of states as producers and consumers of extrajurisdictional
enforcement assistance. It balances the traditional emphasis on the
allocation of the global tax base with the modern challenge of collect-
ing tax, providing an escape from the legitimacy traps that plague
today's international tax regime. In the simplest terms, it would
reward states not only for their role in supporting productive eco-
nomic activity but also for their efforts to combat failures such as cor-
porate income shifting and individual tax evasion.213
The benefits and burdens principle would supplement the extant
allocative norm by introducing a compliance element. Now, treaties
and domestic law allocate taxing jurisdiction solely according to the
taxpayer's residence and the source of the investment.214 Assigning
revenue partly to reflect a state's enforcement contribution would
promote both input and output legitimacy, providing a possible
escape from a legitimacy trap.
In addition to alleviating the pressure to sacrifice input legiti-
macy, the benefits and burdens principle would affirmatively
encourage states to embrace extrajurisdictional enforcement obliga-
tions. For example, information exchange agreements presume that
tax havens-often the sort of small, developing countries least likely
to have the necessary administrative capacity215-will devote scarce
them enforce their taxes (or to help other states enforce their own taxes). See Dean,
supra note 164, at 161-62.
212 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
213 It is at least theoretically possible to balance enforcement needs alongside the
traditional emphasis on allocation. See Dean, supra note 59, at 605 (suggesting that a
more complete market for extraterritorial tax information might encourage states to
augment their enforcement capacity); Dean, supra note 164, at 127 (concluding that
encouraging states to play complementary roles would permit states to capitalize on
relative strengths, including enforcement).
214 See supra note 8.
215 It is viewed as "unlikely that a developing country can actually administer a
broad-based, 'global' individual income tax . . . ." James Alm & Sally Wallace, Can
Developing Countries Impose an Individual Income Tax? in THE CHALLENGES OF TAX
REFORM IN A GLOBAL EcoNoMY 221, 221 (James Alm et al. eds., 2006). The OECD
recently highlighted the same point. See ORG. FOR EcoN. CO-OPERATION & DEV.
(OECD), DOMESTIC RESOURCE MOBILISATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 1 (2010), available at
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resources to extrajursidictional enforcement.216 Reallocating reve-
nues to reflect a state's extrajurisdictional enforcement efforts would
give those states an opportunity to earn a share of global revenues by
taking extrajurisdictional enforcement seriously.2 17
As described below, the benefits and burdens approach can be
operationalized on a transactional basis or at an aggregate level. The
next subpart offers illustrations of both types of arrangement. Each
would force states to bear part of the burden of transnational tax
enforcement, either by affirmatively embracing that burden or by sac-
rificing revenues it might otherwise collect.
B. Implementing the Benefits and Burdens Principle
Insisting that states shoulder the burden of extrajurisdictional tax
enforcement would require an unambiguous change in the behavior
of states of all kinds. Tax havens could not feign commitment to curb-
ing tax evasion without putting their fiscal stability in jeopardy.2 18 No
less important, the damage done by the systematic pruning of U.S.
extraterritorial tax information acquisition capacity would be more
likely to decrease, rather than increase, U.S. tax revenues.
Weaving a rule or a standard out of that balanced principle would
serve both as a guide and a goad for states. Such a mechanism would
divide global tax revenues according to multiple factors. For example,
it might look not only to the proportion of the world's sales that occur
in a particular jurisdiction but also to a measure of the enforcement
assistance it provides to other states.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/62/44465017.pdf (noting that developing coun-
tries "often lack the resources and capacity to build effective tax administration");
OECD, supra note 16, 1 22 (describing efforts to promote conclusion of exchange of
information arrangements with small states).
216 See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Technology and Taxation in Developing Coun-
tries: From Hand to Mouse, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 791, 791-93 (2008) (describing challenges
developing countries face in administering modern tax regimes under severe
resource constraints). Ensuring that resources flow to states in proportion to their
willingness to shoulder that burden would align the interests of tax havens with those
of other states and bolster the integrity of the global tax base. See Steven A. Dean,
Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and
International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 911, 958-59 (2007) (proposing paying
tax havens a percentage of additional revenues generated by their cooperation).
217 See infra note 224 and accompanying text.
218 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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1. The Transactional Approach
Under the benefits and burdens principle, if one state were to
adopt policies that made it more difficult for other states to enforce
their taxes, that action would be reflected in their share of global reve-
nues. As a result, such behavior would not only have an adverse effect
on the integrity of the international tax regime but would also hurt
the wayward state's own bottom line. Conversely, remedying such a
failure would not merely bolster enforcement in an abstract sense, but
would also enhance that state's fiscal well-being.
A transactional approach to implementing the benefits and bur-
dens principle might require only incremental changes to benefits
principle-based approaches. For example, take Avi-Yonah's multi-lat-
eral withholding tax.219 His proposal envisioned that OECD states
would participate to gain access to information about their residents.
Under a pure benefits regime, the administrative burden of imposing
a fully refundable withholding tax on payments to foreign investors
would not be a means of directly generating revenue.220 Instead it
would represent an indirect cost of collecting taxes tied to its contri-
bution to the global economy.
A transactional implementation of the benefits and burdens prin-
ciple might provide only a partial refund of the tax withheld by the
host jurisdiction. 221 Avi-Yonah suggests a more modest refinement,
permitting hostjurisdictions to retain "a small percentage of the tax as
a fee for its collection assistance."22 2 By going further, providing them
with a share of revenues that reflects a return on-rather than a reim-
bursement of-their enforcement contribution, host jurisdictions
219 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1669-70 (proposing a fully refundable withhold-
ing tax to encourage taxpayers to report offshore income to their residence
jurisdictions).
220 By bartering information with other states, the host jurisdiction would be bet-
ter able to tax its own residents, but would not tax the foreign investors. See id.
221 The European Union Savings Directive that inspired Avi-Yonah's proposals
ultimately did something quite similar. It provided that certain jurisdictions could,
for a limited time, collect a withholding tax, transferring "the greater part of their
revenue of this withholding tax" to the residence jurisdiction. See Council Directive
2003/48, arts. 17-19, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 (EC) arts. 17-19.
222 Avi-Yonah, supra note 5, at 1669 n.457. The precedent he cites for such an
arrangement provides for a fee of twenty-five percent of the amount collected, but it is
not clear whether this represents the "small percentage" his proposal indicates. Simi-
lar proposals have suggested different splits. Even those proposals that create incen-
tives for cooperation tend to adhere to the benefits principle. See, e.g., Langer, supra
note 210, at 648 (envisioning tax havens agreeing to provide extrajurisdictional
enforcement assistance of fifty percent of taxes withheld on payments to tax haven
residents).
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would acquire a direct stake in the success of another jurisdiction's
tax. Revenue generated by each transaction would be allocated in
part in response to the creation of the underlying income (as the ben-
efits principle requires) and in part in response to a state's willingness
to bear the burden of providing extrajurisdictional enforcement
assistance.
Such an arrangement would appropriately acknowledge the sig-
nificance of the role played by the host in forcing the disclosure of
information to the residence jurisdiction. The allocation of a mean-
ingful portion of the tax to the hostjurisdiction would increase output
legitimacy by encouraging extrajurisdictional enforcement assistance.
In a benefits-only world that bifurcation would undoubtedly decrease
input legitimacy. The benefits principle requires revenues to be allo-
cated exclusively to the jurisdictions that help to produce economic
income, but a benefits and burdens approach would not. In benefits
principle terms, the payment to the jurisdiction providing enforce-
ment assistance would be an illicit windfall. 223
2. The Aggregate Approach
Rather than focusing on efforts to collect tax on particular trans-
actions or from particular taxpayers, an aggregate approach would
adopt a broader perspective. It might, for instance, rely on a mutually
agreed-upon benchmark such as the quantity and quality of informa-
tion made available to other jurisdictions to trigger allocations of reve-
nue.224 For instance, tax havens providing information on par with
the reports U.S. authorities receive from domestic sources might
receive a percentage of the seventy billion of U.S. revenues estimated
to be lost to offshore tax evasion each year.225
One could imagine an international tax regime that allocates tax
revenues along two dimensions. In addition to a traditional benefits
allocation, it could also employ a second element. Allocations accord-
ing to that second, burdens-oriented metric would encourage states to
devote the resources needed to address the vulnerabilities that plague
223 Even when such "side-payments" are possible and result in an efficient
exchange of assistance for cash, they remain beyond conventional benefits principle
boundaries on state behavior, uncomfortably like paying a bribe or blackmail. See
Rosenzweig, supra note 13, at 584 ("[S]tates can share information and as a result
make side-payments or other bargains to mitigate the potential sucker payoff
described in the bilateral one-time prisoner's dilemma situation.").
224 See Dean, supra note 216, at 963-64 (describing operation of tax flight treaties
that call for states to pay a percentage of the revenues preserved through the coopera-
tion of former tax havens to those former havens).
225 See supra note 55.
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today's international tax regime. For example, the extant transfer
pricing regime does a poorjob of evaluating the risk borne by related
parties. Without understanding those risks it is impossible to accu-
rately estimate the relative return that each party should earn from a
particular transaction.226 Providing states with an incentive to develop
techniques to measure that risk and, no less important, to implement
those techniques would produce a system that is more legitimate than
today's transfer pricing mechanisms.
A stylized numerical example can illustrate the operation of an
aggregate approach. Such a system might compare the resources
states devote to promoting extrajurisdictional enforcement-mea-
sured as the amounts each state spends to assist other states in enforc-
ing their taxes-and divide a predetermined share of collective
revenues accordingly.227 For example, assume there are two states:
Big and Small. They agree to pool ten percent of their revenues, with
each state receiving a share of that pool proportionate to their relative
expenditures on extrajurisdictional enforcement.
Big Small
Post-cooperation Revenues $100 $20
Pooling Contribution $10 $2
Extrajurisdictional $2 $1
Enforcement Expenses
Share of Pooled Revenues $8 $4
Revenues after Pooling $98 $22
Big collects taxes of one hundred, contributing ten, while Small
collects twenty, contributing two. Big spends two to help Small
226 I am grateful to Erika Nijenhuis for this insight.
227 Allocating a percentage of transactional revenues to cooperating jurisdictions
might be viewed as a modest step beyond the types of cost-reimbursement provisions
that could be viewed as consistent with the benefits principle. Even the OECD model
tax information provides for the possibility of cost-reimbursement. See OECD, supra
note 75, at art. 9 (providing that states should specify the "[i]ncidence of costs
incurred in providing assistance"). For one jurisdiction to effectively pay another a
percentage of its general revenues would be another matter. Even if it would produce
an increase in compliance large enough to ensure that all jurisdictions received
increased revenues, it would clearly conflict with the benefits principle and would
today be illegitimate.
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enforce its taxes while Small spends one to help Big.22 8 As a result,
Big will pay in ten and collect eight (a net contribution of two). By
contrast, Small will pay in two and collect four (a net receipt of two).
C. Push and Pull
Whether it follows the aggregate or the transactional path, it
would be hard not to conclude that the distance from the benefits
principle to the benefits and burdens principle is even greater than
that from standards to rules.229 Persuading policymakers-and those
with influence over them-to retire a principle with a pedigree as dis-
tinguished as the benefits principle would be a daunting task. Never-
theless, if a better principle could make meaningful inroads against
the enforcement failures that threaten to swamp tax authorities, the
potential gains could be correspondingly large. An international tax
regime capable once again of generating the push and pull of input
and output legitimacy could help to turn the tide in their-and, by
extension, our-favor.
CONCLUSION
The international tax regime has begun to reject standards in
favor of rules. That trend is understandable, but misguided. No rule
or standard can overcome the deeper weakness that threatens the
long-term viability of the international tax regime. To solve today's
international tax problems as well as the benefits principle tamed
those faced by the international tax regime a century ago, that princi-
ple needs an overhaul. Unless the international tax regime's focus on
enforcement is reflected in the principle from which it draws strength,
the international tax regime will remain mired in a legitimacy trap. A
228 Small's costs will not be one-fifth the size of Big's since it must match much of
the administrative infrastructure that Big puts in place.
229 Any such arrangement would represent a radical departure from existing prac-
tice. In the above illustration, each state contributes ten percent of its overall tax
revenues and receives a percentage of the total determined according to its relative
extrajurisdictional enforcement expenditures. That percentage could fall over time
so that after, for example, thirty years, the contribution might represent one percent
of overall revenues. These numbers are purely hypothetical, but the costs of coopera-
tion presumably will fall over time. The decline would also encourage the most mar-
ginal states-those with the least motivation and/or resources-to participate
immediately. Since those extrajurisdictional enforcement expenditures are not
merely a function of a state's revenues, states will inevitably receive more or less than
they contribute. States that are small, poor, or both would tend to benefit under such
an arrangement. On the other hand, jurisdictions that express only an insincere com-
mitment to cooperate will collect a correspondingly smaller share.
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new principle-the benefits and burdens principle-could support
rules and standards that promote enforcement without sacrificing
legitimacy.
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